Emerging Middle Powers on World Stage: Fantasy or Reality

False Promise of Middle Power Alliances

Mark Carney’s call for middle powers to build strategic autonomy and uphold a rules-based international order is insightful but ultimately limited. It says the idea is attractive in theory, but real geopolitical and economic pressures make a coordinated middle-power bloc unlikely to solve the deeper problems of global disorder.

• Carney’s speech frames the current crisis as a collapse of the postwar international order and urges middle powers to rely less on the US-China rivalry.
• His vision is too optimistic because middle powers have different strategic interests, making collective action difficult.
• It argues that major powers, Global South countries, and domestic political realities are being overlooked.
• Ad hoc coalitions and self-reliance are seen as insufficient for handling global issues like trade protectionism, nuclear proliferation, and environmental security.
• The real causes of the international order’s weakening are deeper material and historical shifts, not just lack of political will.

In this sense, Carney’s prescription is more a statement of aspiration than a workable strategy. Middle powers may indeed share a preference for stability, openness, and multilateral cooperation, but shared values do not automatically translate into shared interests. Countries such as Canada, Australia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa occupy very different regional environments and confront distinct security and economic pressures. Some are closely aligned with the United States, others are seeking greater room to maneuver, and still others are balancing competing great-power relationships.

As a result, the idea of a unified middle-power coalition risks glossing over the asymmetries that define the contemporary world. Even where cooperation is possible, it is likely to remain issue-specific, temporary, and conditional rather than comprehensive or durable. This makes it difficult for middle powers to function as a coherent geopolitical bloc capable of reshaping the international system on its own.

The deeper challenge, then, is not simply how middle powers should respond to disorder, but why disorder has become so entrenched. The erosion of the post-war order reflects not just the rise of new powers, but the weakening of the institutions, norms, and material foundations that once sustained it. Economic globalization has produced winners and losers, strategic competition has intensified, and domestic politics in many countries have become less supportive of international cooperation. These structural shifts cannot be reversed by rhetoric alone.

If middle powers are to matter, they will need to do more than reaffirm liberal principles. They will need to build practical capacities, identify limited and realistic areas of cooperation, and accept that the international system is now too fragmented for any single vision of order to command universal support. Carney’s speech is therefore best understood not as a blueprint for a new global settlement, but as a reminder of how difficult it has become to imagine one.

Middle Power Concept is not Credible

The idea that Middle Powers can credibly replace the U.S.-anchored order is weak. In principle, a coalition of middle powers might seem well positioned to fill the gap. They are numerous, economically significant, and often share an interest in preserving openness, predictability, and rules. Countries such as Canada, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia all have reasons to resist great-power coercion and to prefer a more stable international environment.

But these similarities are not enough to overcome their differences. Middle powers vary widely in geography, security needs, domestic politics, and strategic priorities. Some depend heavily on U.S. security guarantees, while others seek greater autonomy. Some are deeply integrated into China-centered trade networks, while others view Beijing as a threat. Their interests overlap, but only partially, and usually only on narrow issues. As a result, middle-power coordination tends to be episodic and issue-specific rather than the basis for a coherent alternative order.

Moreover, the institutions that made multilateralism effective in the past were not built by middle powers alone. They were supported by U.S. leadership, even if that leadership was often imperfect or self-interested. The United States supplied the security umbrella, market access, and institutional weight that gave multilateral rules real force. Without that backing, middle powers may be able to manage specific problems, but they are unlikely to construct a durable global system on their own.

This does not mean middle powers are powerless. They can still shape outcomes by forming coalitions, defending norms, and exploiting divisions between the major powers. They can keep channels open, reduce escalation, and preserve parts of the existing order where possible. But their role is more defensive than transformative. They can slow decline, hedge against uncertainty, and protect their interests at the margins; they cannot easily remake the system from the center.

In the end, the world is moving into an era of disorder in which middle powers must adapt to great-power rivalry rather than transcend it. The dream of a new multilateralism led from the middle remains attractive, but without the involvement of the United States—and in the face of an assertive China—it is more aspiration than strategy.

Asian versus European Responses to Trump

U.S. allies in Asia and Western Europe are responding very differently to Trump-era American transactionalism. Asian allies are more willing to accept unequal deals with Washington because they face a stronger immediate threat from China and still need U.S. security guarantees. Western European countries, by contrast, are more resistant, relying on institutions, welfare states, and hopes for a post-Trump return to traditional transatlantic cooperation.

• Asia is more pragmatic: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and others accept transactional U.S. demands in exchange for security against China.
• Europe is more resistant: Western Europe is trying to reduce dependence on the U.S. through “de-Americanization,” EU unity, and stronger regional autonomy.
• Security vs. welfare tradeoff: Europe has historically prioritized social spending over defense, while Asian allies see U.S. protection as essential.
• Trump accelerates a hierarchy: The U.S. is increasingly demanding more from allies, and countries that need its protection are adapting, even if the terms are unequal.
• Long-term risk remains: Asian allies may gain short-term security, but both Europe and Asia face growing vulnerability as U.S. power becomes more unpredictable.

This divergence is not simply a matter of culture or political temperament. It reflects different strategic environments. In Asia, the rise of China creates an immediate and unavoidable security dilemma. States such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan cannot easily replace the United States with another guarantor, and they cannot afford to wait for a more favorable political climate in Washington. As a result, they are more willing to tolerate unequal arrangements, higher costs, and public humiliation if doing so preserves American protection.

Western Europe faces a different situation. Although Russia remains a threat, it does not present the same scale of economic and geopolitical challenge that China does in Asia. Europe also possesses stronger institutions, denser internal cooperation, and a broader sense that its security can be managed collectively through the EU and NATO, rather than through bilateral dependence on Washington alone. This makes European governments more capable of resisting American pressure, even if their alternatives are limited.

At the same time, Europe’s resistance is not cost-free. Calls for strategic autonomy often run ahead of actual military capability. European states continue to rely heavily on U.S. intelligence, logistics, nuclear deterrence, and rapid deployment capacity. The result is a gap between aspiration and reality: Europe wants greater independence, but it is still structurally tied to the United States.

Asia, meanwhile, is adjusting more quietly and more pragmatically. Rather than openly challenging American dominance, many Asian allies are accommodating U.S. demands while strengthening their own regional ties and hedging against future uncertainty. This creates a more stable short-term relationship, but one that is also deeply unequal and potentially fragile.

In the end, the Trump era exposed a larger truth about alliance politics: dependence shapes behavior. Those who depend most on American power are often the most willing to accept its terms, even when they are unfavorable. But as U.S. reliability becomes less certain, both Asia and Europe are being pushed to rethink the foundations of their security.