Ahead of NATO Summit in Ankara

Future of NATO

Turkey is hosting a major NATO summit in Ankara with extensive security measures and political significance. The event is meant to project Turkey’s importance in the alliance while leaders discuss NATO unity, defense spending, and the U.S. role amid tensions caused by Donald Trump’s criticism of allies. Key points:

• Turkey deployed tens of thousands of police, tightened air defenses, and imposed broad restrictions on gatherings, traffic, and media access.
• The summit will bring together leaders of NATO’s 32 members, including Trump, with unity and alliance defense spending expected to dominate talks.
• Turkey has often acted independently within NATO, but it is currently tilting closer to the West and playing a more central role in alliance security.
• Ankara’s measures have disrupted daily life and drawn criticism over freedom of expression, assembly, and press access.

Relations inside NATO remain strained by disagreements over burden-sharing, the war in Ukraine, and how to handle Russia. Turkey is likely to use the summit to highlight its strategic value as a bridge between Europe, the Middle East, and the Black Sea. Finally, analysts say the meeting could also serve as a test of whether the alliance can present a united front despite political divisions and shifting U.S. leadership.

The central question, then, is not whether NATO can agree on ambitious language in Ankara, but whether it can convert repeated commitments into measurable capability before the security environment deteriorates further. The alliance has spent years diagnosing the same weaknesses: underinvestment, fragmented procurement, slow industrial output, and uneven burden-sharing. What Ankara will test is whether those diagnoses have finally produced a meaningful change in behavior.

For supporters of the alliance, there are reasons for cautious optimism. The war in Ukraine has already accelerated policy changes that once seemed politically impossible. Governments that long resisted higher defense spending are now treating it as a strategic necessity. NATO members are also increasingly aware that modern deterrence depends not only on troop numbers, but on stockpiles, ammunition production, air defense, cyber resilience, and the ability to replace losses quickly. In that sense, the summit may not deliver a dramatic new doctrine, but it could still mark another step in the alliance’s long and uneven adaptation to a more dangerous era.

Yet the risks remain substantial. If defense targets continue to be treated as aspirational rather than binding, the alliance may discover that its rhetorical unity exceeds its practical readiness. A mismatch between political commitments and actual military capacity would be especially dangerous at a time when Russia may be tempted to probe NATO’s resolve through limited, deniable, or hybrid actions. The credibility of deterrence depends on more than declarations; it depends on the visible ability to respond.

Ankara, then, may become a defining test of NATO’s seriousness. If the summit produces not only stronger promises but also clearer plans, faster procurement, and sustained investment, it could strengthen the alliance’s long-term posture. If not, it risks becoming another reminder that NATO’s greatest challenge is not knowing what must be done, but doing it quickly enough.

Background on Turkey in NATO

NATO’s relationship with Turkey is defined by a long-standing paradox: Turkey is militarily and geographically crucial to the alliance, but also one of its most politically difficult and mistrusted members. This tension is likely to become more visible at the 2026 NATO summit in Ankara, especially as uncertainty about U.S. commitment to European security grows.

Turkey is strategically essential: It has NATO’s second-largest army and sits at the crossroads of the Black Sea, Middle East, Caucasus, and eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey is also a challenging ally: Disputes over Syria, the S-400 purchase, Cyprus, Greece, democratic backsliding, and frequent use of NATO leverage have strained trust.

This is an old pattern: Since joining NATO in 1952, Turkey’s value has tended to rise when security threats increase, while doubts about its reliability return when threats ease.

The current security climate may increase Turkey’s importance: Russia’s war in Ukraine, instability on NATO’s southern flank, and uncertainty about U.S. strategy could make Turkey harder for allies to sideline.

 The core question: whether NATO can treat Turkey as a stragically necessary partner despite continued political discomfort?

That dynamic is likely to dominate discussions in Ankara, where the alliance will be forced to confront an uncomfortable reality: NATO’s southern and eastern defenses cannot be fully organized without Turkey, yet any attempt to rely on Turkey also requires navigating a relationship marked by recurring mistrust.

In practical terms, Turkey gives NATO what few other members can. It provides depth on the Black Sea, access to the Mediterranean, a buffer against instability in the Middle East, and a military infrastructure that has mattered in nearly every major crisis the alliance has faced since the Cold War. Turkish bases, airspace, and logistics routes have repeatedly been useful to NATO operations, while Ankara’s control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles gives it a unique role in shaping naval balance in the Black Sea.

But Turkey’s leverage is not only geographic. It is political. Successive Turkish governments have learned that their country can extract concessions, demand attention, and resist pressure by reminding allies that NATO’s security architecture is incomplete without Turkish cooperation. That has created a pattern in which Turkey is simultaneously indispensable and resented. Allies often depend on Turkish support while questioning Turkish intentions.

The result is a relationship governed less by trust than by necessity. NATO members may disagree with Ankara over democracy, regional policy, or military procurement, but they also know that isolating Turkey is not realistic. Nor is assuming that shared membership automatically produces shared interests. In many ways, the Turkey problem is really a NATO problem: the alliance prides itself on unity, yet its unity has always depended on accommodating members whose priorities do not fully align.

At the same time, Turkey is not simply a spoiler. Its concerns are often rooted in real security anxieties, including threats from terrorism, instability in neighbouring regions, and fears of strategic encirclement. Turkish leaders view the alliance through a lens shaped by geography and history, and that perspective helps explain why Ankara so often resists being treated as a junior partner. From the Turkish point of view, NATO is valuable precisely because it amplifies Turkey’s security and status; from the perspective of many allies, Turkey is valuable but unpredictable.

That tension is unlikely to disappear. If anything, the 2026 summit may highlight a broader transformation in NATO itself. As the alliance adapts to renewed great-power competition, it may find that managing internal disagreement becomes just as important as deterring external threats. In that environment, Turkey will remain central—not because it is the easiest ally, but because it is one of the most unavoidable.

Turkish Defense Industry Growing

An FT article highlights Turkey’s growing defense industry and geographic position make it valuable, yet concerns over Erdoğan’s authoritarianism, economic weakness, and lack of trust continue to limit deeper cooperation. Key points:

• Turkey is now seen by some European and NATO leaders as an “indispensable partner” for Europe’s security, especially in a future with less US involvement.
• Turkey’s defense industry has grown rapidly, producing drones, ammunition, missiles, and other equipment Europe needs.
• Despite closer practical ties, major obstacles remain: Erdoğan’s authoritarian record, legal/economic instability, and mutual mistrust.
• Europe wants Turkey’s military and industrial capacity, while Turkey wants EU access, defense contracts, and technology/finance.
• The relationship is increasingly transactional, but there is still no clear political framework for a true long-term security partnership.

However, this transactional logic may prove difficult to sustain. Europe’s need for Turkish capabilities does not erase deep political tensions, especially over democratic backsliding, human rights, and disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey, for its part, is unlikely to accept a subordinate role or align itself consistently with European priorities without concrete gains in return.

At the same time, Ankara is also balancing relations with Russia, the United States, and regional powers, which makes it an unpredictable partner. This gives Turkey leverage, but it also raises doubts about whether it can be fully trusted in a long-term security architecture. In practice, Europe may have to separate short-term necessity from long-term confidence: working with Turkey when interests overlap, while avoiding the illusion that shared interests automatically create shared values.

The result is a relationship defined by mutual dependence rather than mutual trust. If Europe’s security environment continues to deteriorate, this dependence may deepen further. But without political reconciliation and clearer strategic commitments on both sides, the partnership is likely to remain fragile, improvised, and largely driven by immediate geopolitical pressure rather than lasting alignment.