Vladimir Putin visits Delhi: India-Russia Ties?

Foreign Policy of India and Ties to Russia

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited New Delhi for the first time since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, renewing an annual summit with India amid growing US pressure on New Delhi over its ties to Moscow. The trip underscores India’s long-standing strategy of strategic autonomy—balancing deep historical ties with Russia (especially in defence and energy) while courting closer relations with the United States. Key issues include defence sales (S-400, Su-57), oil trade distortions since 2022, possible economic diversification, and the geopolitical friction caused by US tariffs and sanctions threats under the Trump administration.

Currently, most imports from Russia are oil. In fact, $59 Billion out of a total of $66 Billion. Exports to Russia total only $4 Billion. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Moscow deepen ties despite US pressure on India to curb Russian oil purchases.

The visit highlights longstanding India–Russia strategic relations, growing economic links (largely driven by Russian oil), defence cooperation, and India’s effort to maintain strategic autonomy amid global geopolitical tensions over the Ukraine war.

The question we need to ask is this just to displeasure at Trump or is it a real shift?

Key points

• Visit details: Putin’s 30-hour visit included meetings with PM Narendra Modi, a state reception, business engagements and the annual India‑Russia summit—resuming a tradition interrupted since 2022.
• Defence: Russia remains India’s largest defence supplier (around 36% of recent imports); discussions focused on more S-400 systems and sales of Su-57 fighters.
• Energy and trade: Russia became a major oil supplier to India since 2022, inflating bilateral trade to ~$69bn but creating a large, lopsided deficit; US sanctions and tariffs have already begun to reduce Russian crude imports.
• Geopolitics: India seeks to preserve strategic autonomy—balancing ties with Russia and the US—while avoiding damage to either relationship; Trump’s tariffs and sanctions threaten to complicate New Delhi’s choices.
• Economic prospects: Ambitions to reach $100bn trade by 2030 look distant; labor migration from India to fill Russian workforce gaps and diversification into pharma, machinery and agriculture are potential growth areas.

 According to a Bloomberg article. India has agreed to lease a Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine for about $2 billion, finalizing a deal after roughly a decade of talks. Indian officials visited a Russian shipyard in November, and New Delhi expects delivery within about two years (though complexity could delay it). The lease is for 10 years and intended for training and to help India develop nuclear-boat operations; under the terms the vessel cannot be used in wartime.

The lease aims to train Indian sailors and accelerate India’s nuclear-submarine capability; India already operates 17 diesel subs and is building indigenous nuclear submarines and SLBMs.

Geopolitical Implications of Strategy Autonomy

India’s 2025 foreign-policy year has been unusually difficult for Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Hosting leaders from Russia, China and potentially the United States in quick succession highlighted New Delhi’s long-standing commitment to “strategic autonomy,” but recent events exposed the limits and costs of that stance. A deteriorating India–U.S. relationship under President Trump, renewed India–Pakistan clashes, and criticism over India’s reluctance to play proactive mediating roles in global crises have underscored the need for India to rethink a passive version of strategic autonomy and pursue a more proactive, indispensable global role. 

At the moment, Trump needs to put pressure on Russia in order to bring both sides to the negotiating table.  This means pressure on India to reduce oil imports from Russia.  In this scenario India’s strategic autonomy strategy is a liability since it will be difficult to balance ties with both the US and Russia.  However, if Trump can broker a  settlement on the Ukraine-Russian war, then India can play the middle and balance both sides.  In that scenario, strategic autonomy has a greater chance to succeed.  

Key points

• 2025 brought high-stakes diplomacy (visits from Putin, likely Xi, possible Trump) that showcased India’s nonaligned/strategic-autonomy posture but also its vulnerability.
• India–U.S. ties worsened: trade deal failures, high U.S. tariffs, personal friction between leaders, and perceived U.S. outreach to Pakistan strained relations.
• India–Pakistan violence in 2025 (terror attack, four-day conflict) was the worst in decades and complicated New Delhi’s external alignments and domestic pressures.
• Strategic autonomy provides flexibility but can appear aloof; India has often avoided active mediation in global crises, reducing its influence compared with more proactive regional players.
• India should move from passive nonalignment to a proactive “strategic indispensability” — deeper, consequential engagement to avoid being sidelined by great-power politics.