Turkish Geopolitics and Foreign Policy

Rapidly Changing Geopolitical Environment and Turkey

The Ukrainian-Russian War, the fall of Asad in Syria, recent Israeli military actions and tensions in the Eastern Mediterrainian have impacted Turkey. Let’s look at how and what each of these developments and more mean for Turkey.

In the geopolitics of the Middle East, there are several powers vying for leadership. In addition to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel and Egypt are current or future contestants.

Fall of Asad in Syria: Opportunity and Threat

Turkey hoped Assad’s fall would solve multiple problems—Syrian refugees, Kurdish militias, and Russian/Iranian influence—but instead the post-Assad landscape has worsened Ankara’s strategic dilemma. Israel rapidly expanded its military presence in Syria, weakening prospects for Turkish leverage; sectarian violence (notably Suwayda) and a weak interim government have hardened minority and Kurdish demands; Russia’s role is limited in constraining Israel or resolving Kurdish issues; and renewed Turkish military options risk empowering hardliners and undermining Erdogan’s domestic political goals. The piece argues Turkey needs a new approach—accepting genuine local autonomy for Syrian minorities (including Kurds) and rethinking centralized solutions—if it wants stability in Syria and political gains at home.

Key points

• Israel quickly capitalized on Assad’s fall, extending military reach into southern Syria and diminishing Ankara’s influence there.
• The Suwayda crisis exposed the weakness of the interim government, fueled minority distrust, and strengthened calls for autonomy rather than centralized rule.
• Russia’s presence in Syria cannot reliably check Israel or solve Turkey’s Kurdish problem; closer Damascus Moscow ties risk alienating Western partners.
• A new Turkish military intervention risks empowering PKK hardliners, undermining Ocalan talks, and damaging Erdogan’s 2028 political calculus.
• The recommended shift: Turkey should consider supporting meaningful local autonomy and constitutional guarantees for Syrian minorities (including Kurds) rather than pursuing a Turkey style centralized outcome.

Implications of The ‘Blue Homeland’ Turkish Policy

 Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine and expansionist moves are putting Cyprus (primarily) and the wider Eastern Mediterranean under growing geopolitical and energy-security pressure. Ankara’s unilateral maritime claims, bilateral deals with states like Libya (and reportedly Syria), and support for the Turkish-occupied north of Cyprus seek to undermine Cyprus’s UNCLOS-based EEZ agreements and regional energy projects. Cyprus is responding through legal action, regional partnerships (Egypt, Greece, Israel, Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum), stronger ties with the UK and EU, and measures to protect investment and LNG capacity. The broader risk: if Ankara’s tactics succeed, they could weaken the rules-based maritime order and encourage other states to flout international law.

Key points

• Blue Homeland: Turkey’s doctrine asserts wide maritime claims (~462,000 km2) in the Eastern Mediterranean, challenging UNCLOS-based EEZs and prompting persistent tensions.
• Bilateral deals and tactics: Ankara uses bilateral MoUs (e.g., with Libya) and may seek similar pacts (reportedly with Syria) to pre-empt lawful EEZ delimitations and legitimize activities in waters claimed by Cyprus.
• Energy and security stakes: Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons are important for regional economic cooperation and European energy diversification; Turkish disruption risks investment, projects, and gives Turkey leverage as an energy gatekeeper.
• Cypriot response: Nicosia strengthens regional alliances (Greece, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, EMGF), pursues legal avenues, secures energy investment and LNG infrastructure, and deepens ties with the UK, EU and other partners to uphold maritime rights.
• Wider implications: Unchecked Turkish actions could erode international maritime norms, set precedents for other revisionist moves, and destabilize broader regional and global maritime order.

Our view is that if the Cyprus issue is settled between Turkey and Greece, then differences in the Aegean Sea between both countries will also be settled. Perhaps the meeting between Erdogan and Trump this week will touch on this issue behind closed doors.

Turkey recently signed a 20-year deal to buy US gas and phase out Russian gas. This is a sign that Erdogan is keen to get back on good terms with the US. The next step would be some kind of agreement to settle tensions in the Eastern Meditterrean with both Greece and Cyprus.

This would be done with the vision to remake the Middle East and stability in the Eastern Meditterean is a precondition. If things move in the right direction here then once the divided island of Cyprus issue is settled, we expect an Aegean Sea demarcation to occur. In addition, the proposed pipeline going from Isreal (and Egypt) to Cyprus, then Greece and Europe (through Italy) could flow through Turkey and connect to already existing pipelines. In fact, it would be much cheaper and more viable.

As it stand right now, it would be difficult for President Erdogan of Turkey to get back into the US F-35 fighter jet program. Remember, the purchase of the Russian S-400 missle system back during the first Trump term. After the Turkish decision, Trump removed them from the F-35 jet program. This was probably worth about $100 Billion US Dollars since Turkey was going to get a piece of repair and maintenance portion for F-35 jets.

Therefore, we need to anlyze things as related. If this then that might occur. In other words, both Israeli and Greek lobbying efforts against Turkey would dissapear or lesson if things got better in the Eastern Meditterrean. Therefore, the issues are interrelated.

Competition with Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel

Turkey and Saudi Arabia are competing for power in the Middle East. This is an intense rivalry of two middle powers. We don’t expect this to go away but the intensity of the rivalry would vary over time.

As stated earlier, if the Middle East is in the process of being remade (one possible scenario), then tensions between these countries, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, can be reduced. In the case of Israel, Turkey was a close ally in the past and this is still possible in the furture.

With Iran, the rivalry is lower now since both the US and Israel weakened Iranian power and influence in the Middle East. Relations are cautiously cordial between the two with borders established. Now that Syria has fallen, Iran is no longer a factor there.

 Turkey’s Middle Power Strategy and Limitations

Turkey has pursued a middle-power strategy of “strategic autonomy,” diversifying diplomatic, economic, and security ties beyond its traditional Western partners to expand influence across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. This approach produced tangible gains (notably influence in Syria after Assad’s collapse and rapid growth in defense exports and diplomatic presence), but also created economic vulnerabilities, diplomatic strains with Western allies, and limits imposed by dependency on foreign technology, markets, and capital. To sustain its ambitions, Turkey must strengthen its domestic economy and institutions, manage tradeoffs with traditional partners, and accept realistic limits on how far transactional, nonaligned diplomacy can go.

Key points

• Turkey shifted toward multipolar engagement: expanded diplomatic missions, grew trade with Asia and Africa, joined BRICS application and SCO dialogue, and invested heavily in transport and infrastructure.
• Foreign-policy successes: assertive role in Syria (increasing leverage after Assad’s collapse), mediation in Africa, and prominent defense exports (Bayraktar drones, $7.2B defense aerospace exports in 2024).
• Economic risks of hedging: deep but asymmetric trade ties with Russia and China, heavy reliance on EU/US markets and capital, technological import dependence (advanced tech only ~4% of manufacturing exports), and underperformance attracting FDI versus peers.
• Diplomatic costs: transactional posture strained ties with EU, U.S., regional neighbors; choices such as S-400 purchase led to concrete penalties (F-35 exclusion); transactional deals (e.g., refugee arrangements with EU) have political and normative costs.
• Policy prescription: Turkey needs a realistic hedging strategy—build resilient domestic economy and institutions, pursue targeted industrial policy and tech capacity, repair and recalibrate relations with Western partners while engaging non-Western actors, and avoid overreach that risks isolation or economic disruption.

Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and multipolar hedging has expanded its diplomatic footprint and created domestic capabilities—especially in defense and regional influence—but it has also revealed vulnerabilities stemming from economic imbalances, technological dependencies, and diplomatic frictions with traditional allies. A sustainable path combines credible macroeconomic management, selective industrial upgrading, institutional reform, and pragmatic diplomacy that balances engagement with the West and selective partnerships elsewhere. By focusing on realistic, measurable goals and aligning incentives across government and industry, Turkey can preserve strategic autonomy without sacrificing the economic and technological integration necessary for long-term prosperity.