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Trump Administration: Latin America and National Security Strategy

Trump Strategy in Latin America

The new US National Security Strategy (NSS) (5 December) emphasizes containing China and Russia while reasserting US dominance in the Western Hemisphere — a modern “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. It calls for increased military, economic, and political control of Latin America to secure resources, supply chains, and migration routes, links migration to civilizational threats, and prioritizes combating organized crime. Critics say the plan is vague, militarizes non‑military problems, omits key partners (e.g., Canada, detailed ties with Mexico/Brazil), and advocates coercive access to resources rather than traditional investment and diplomacy. Latin American governments may respond pragmatically — balancing US pressure with continued ties to China and others — but public reactions have been muted so far. Key points:

  • NSS priorities: contain China/Russia and reassert US preeminence in the Western Hemisphere (a “Trump Corollary” to Monroe Doctrine).
  • Action items promoted: expand military/naval presence, secure borders and migration routes, target cartels, control critical supply chains and resource access.
  • Tone and rhetoric: frames migration as an existential threat; reflects MAGA-aligned actors and cultural‑war language.
  • Criticisms: plan is contradictory, vague, risks militarizing migration/crime, omits Canada and detailed bilateral strategies, and favors coercion over investment/diplomacy.
  • Regional implications: Latin American states may pursue pragmatic balancing between the US and China; public official responses have been limited so far.

Ideological Underpinings of Trump’s Policy for Latin America

Donald Trump openly admires and forms ties with populist, often authoritarian leaders like Turkey’s Recep Erdoğan and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, and that affinity extends across Latin America. Recent and emerging right‑wing figures—Jair Bolsonaro, Nayib Bukele, Javier Milei and others—mirror Trump’s outsider, media‑savvy, anti‑establishment playbook. Their popularity has sometimes been built alongside attacks on independent institutions, media and judicial checks, producing democratic backsliding, mass arrests, and threats to human rights. A returning Trump administration would likely cultivate and rely on these leaders for transactional cooperation (e.g., on migration or geopolitical competition with China), risking further erosion of regional institutions such as the OAS and the Inter‑American Human Rights System. Main points:

  • Trump’s personal and political affinity with populist strongmen extends to Latin America (Bolsonaro, Bukele, Milei), reinforcing ideological and tactical links across the hemisphere.
  • These leaders share a trajectory: outsider origins, media mastery, mobilizing public anger, and undermining checks and independent institutions once in power.
  • Consequences include democratic erosion: mass arrests (El Salvador), court packing, attacks on media, threats to opposition and electoral integrity (Brazil), and executive concentration of power.
  • A future Trump administration may tacitly support or overlook abuses for short‑term cooperation, weakening regional human‑rights institutions (OAS, Inter‑American system) and normalizing “Trumpista” authoritarian tendencies.

Geopolitics: Swing towards Hardpower

U.S. attention to Latin America and the Caribbean has swung toward coercion under the Trump administration—cutting soft-power aid, deploying military force, and using tariffs and economic pressure—rather than investing in development and democratic institutions. These moves aim to curb migration, drug trafficking, and China’s influence but risk fueling instability, driving countries to diversify away from the U.S., and undermining long-term American interests. Authors recommend pairing necessary firmness with renewed investment in trade, development, and democratic-strengthening programs.

In short, soft-power cuts: Large reductions in USAID and other development programs have weakened U.S. influence, reduced democracy and rule-of-law assistance, and worsened humanitarian conditions—especially in Central America, Colombia, and Haiti—creating openings for China and other actors.

Instead, hard-power escalation: The administration designated cartels as FTOs, increased military deployments in the hemisphere, and authorized strikes (e.g., against a Venezuelan boat), risking escalation, civilian harm, and anti-American backlash while offering only limited, short-term disruption of criminal networks.

Economic coercion: Broad tariffs and sectoral levies on regional partners (steel, aluminum, copper) and targeted sanctions aim to force political outcomes but have prompted trading partners to diversify markets, strengthen ties with other powers, and pursue alternative trade pacts.

Regional responses: Reactions vary—some governments acquiesce or welcome cuts, others protest sovereignty violations; many states are accelerating ties with China, BRICS, EU, or regional blocs to reduce U.S. dependence.

Strategic implication and recommendation: Military and coercive tactics may yield short-term gains but undermine long-term U.S. influence. The report urges combining necessary toughness with sustained investment in trade, development, and democracy-strengthening to secure mutual prosperity and strategic benefits.

Implications of Trump’s Oil Blockade on Venezuela’s Maduro

US President Donald Trump announced a blockade on Venezuela’s oil shipments and deployed naval forces to the Caribbean, escalating pressure on Nicolás Maduro’s government. Experts warn a naval blockade and interdiction of oil shipments represents a major shift toward potential military confrontation and could presage attempts to force regime change. Venezuela still finds partial ways to export oil and raise hard currency (dark‑fleet tankers, help from Russia/Iran, Chevron licences, illicit trade), but severe economic strain and shortages are intensifying. Observers say meaningful removal of Maduro would likely require sustained military pressure, which carries major risks and uncertain post‑conflict control. Key points:

  • Trump announced a “total complete blockade” on Venezuelan oil shipments under US sanctions and positioned warships in the Caribbean; officials seized a tanker recently.
  • Experts characterize a naval blockade as an act of war and say enforcement signals a fundamental shift from sanctions to coercive military pressure.
  • Some exports persist via sanctioned‑evading “dark fleet,” foreign partners, and limited licensed operations (e.g., Chevron); Venezuela also relies on gold, drugs and contraband for hard currency.
  • Venezuela faces accelerating economic collapse (hyperinflation, scarce dollars, dwindling storage and inputs for oil production), but Maduro retains security forces and Cuban/Russian/Iranian ties.
  • Analysts warn that meaningful regime change would likely require direct military action, which raises high risks and unresolved questions about controlling the aftermath.

Seized Venezuelan Tanker Bound for Cuba

A New York Times article investigates that the U.S. seized the oil tanker Skipper in December 2025 after it left Venezuela loaded with nearly two million barrels of heavy crude destined for Cuba. Documents and tracking data show most Venezuelan oil nominally allocated to Cuba has been resold or rerouted — often to China — generating hard currency for Cuba and intermediaries. The seizure highlights a complex, sanctions‑driven web linking Venezuela, Cuba, Iran, and Russia that uses covert shipping, transfers at sea, and trading intermediaries to move fuel and money despite U.S. restrictions. The U.S. move aims to cut Maduro’s funding; Cuba and Venezuela condemned it as piracy.  Key points:

  • Skipper departed Venezuela Dec. 4 with ~2 million barrels; tracking shows it offloaded ~50,000 barrels to another tanker (Neptune 6) bound for Cuba, then sailed toward Asia before being seized.
  • Much oil nominally allocated to Cuba is often resold (not delivered) to raise hard currency; Cubametales and intermediary Ramón Carretero play major roles and were targeted by U.S. sanctions.
  • The seizure operation involved U.S. forces boarding the tanker in international waters; the oil may be brought to Galveston, Texas, under U.S. custody.
  • Venezuela, Cuba, Iran, and Russia have developed shadow logistics—ship transfers, covert fleets, and trading networks—to evade sanctions and keep oil revenues flowing, blending political alliances with commercial motives.

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