Trump Administration Foreign Policy and Latin America Strategy

US Strategic Goals in Latin America

The second Trump presidency has sharply refocused U.S. attention on Latin America, driven by priorities to curb illegal immigration, stop fentanyl and reduce dependence on Chinese goods. Trump’s approach would mix punitive measures (tariffs, sanctions, possible strikes) and pressure on governments to curb migration and reject Chinese investments. While some right-wing Latin leaders welcome closer ties, aggressive policies risk driving countries toward China or provoking backlash. Outcomes depend on whether Washington pairs pressure with economic alternatives and whether migration and drug crises persist.

Key developments include positive measures such as the $20 Billion support for Argentina helping the right-wing government stay in power.  Negative measures such as the 50% tariffs on Brazil are designed to force change within Brazil.  Finally, the military buildup in the Caribbean is geared towards toppling President Maduro of Venezuela by force if necessary.

Latin American countries that are either close to the US or pro US are Panama, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile and Ecuador.  Columbia is close to the US but under the current populist left-wing government has pushed away somewhat.   This is expected to change in the election next year, thus Trump is being tough on Columbia with this in mind.  Bolivia was pro-China but a center right government recently won power thus expect the country to lean towards the west and the US.  Peru is neutral or leaning slightly towards China and the same can be said of the most important country in Latin America, Brazil.  President Lula, a left-wing populist, has lost popular support thus Brazil could see a right-wing leader take over in the next election.  However, China looms big economically for the Brazilian economy. 

Key points

• Trump’s top domestic goals (immigration control, anti-drug measures, reshoring industry) make Latin America central to his second-term agenda.
• Expected tools: tariffs, sanctions, tighter deportations, targeted strikes/drones against cartels, and pressure to block Chinese infrastructure/5G investment.
• Mexico faces the biggest near-term risks (tariffs, trade disruption) because of deep economic ties and shared border challenges.
• S. push against China’s regional influence could include trade penalties and efforts to deter Chinese-built ports, grids, and telecoms; this may push some countries toward Beijing instead.
• Opportunities exist: expanded U.S. investment, nearshoring, and cooperation with like-minded Latin leaders could boost growth—if Washington pairs pressure with credible economic alternatives.
• The ultimate impact depends on crises (migration/fentanyl), who holds influence in the White House, and whether the U.S. can offer viable non-Chinese investment options rather than only coercion.

Geopolitics: Short-Term versus Long-Term Goals

U.S. attention to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been inconsistent since the early 2000s, and that recent Trump administrations (including a second term) shifted sharply from soft-power engagement (aid, development, democracy support) toward hard-power measures (military deployments, FTO designations, strikes) and economic coercion (tariffs, sectoral sanctions). These policies have reduced U.S. influence, worsened humanitarian and governance problems in parts of the region, encouraged countries to diversify partners (notably toward China, Russia, BRICS members), and risk escalating violence and anti-American sentiment. We recommend pairing necessary toughness with renewed investment in development, trade partnerships, and democracy-strengthening to preserve U.S. interests in the hemisphere.

Key points

• Soft-power decline: Major cuts to USAID and other development programs weakened U.S. influence, undermined democracy, human-rights work, and refugee/migrant support—heightening instability in Central America, Colombia, Haiti.
• Hard-power escalation: FTO designation of cartels, military deployments, and strikes in Venezuelan waters signal a willingness to use force; such actions may yield short-term results but risk escalation, civilian harm, displacement, and regional backlash.
• Economic coercion: Broad tariffs and targeted trade pressure pushed LAC countries to diversify markets and deepen ties with other partners (China, EU, BRICS, regional blocs), reducing U.S. economic leverage over time.
• Regional responses mixed: Some governments cooperated with U.S. measures, others condemned them or welcomed aid cuts; many accelerated moves to diversify trade and security partnerships (example Brazil).
• Recommendation: Balance “toughness” on migration and drugs with renewed investments in trade, development, and democracy-strengthening to maintain long-term U.S. strategic interests in the hemisphere.

Conclusions and Additional Insights

President Trump’s hostile, security-first approach to Latin America — using tariffs, deportations, designation of transnational criminal groups as terrorist organisations, and pressure on countries like Mexico and Panama — has produced some short-term tactical gains (reduced border crossings, increased counternarcotics cooperation, shifts in Panama’s China ties). However, these one-dimensional, coercive measures risk long-term failure by neglecting socioeconomic drivers of crime, institutional weakness, and the need to reduce demand for fentanyl. Overreliance on coercion may fuel violence, nationalism, and economic harm that create openings for China and other powers to deepen influence in the region.

Key points

• Trump’s second-term policy frames Latin America as a security threat and prioritises unilateral pressure over partnership (tariffs, deportations, FTO designations, threats around Panama Canal).
• Short-term results include tougher Mexican security responses, drops in border crossings, fentanyl seizures, and Panama distancing itself from China (and possible US-aligned port ownership).
• Limits of the approach: militarised, punitive tactics without social, economic, and institutional reforms are unlikely to stop organised crime and may provoke escalation, new trafficking routes, and resilience of criminal groups.
• Economic coercion and anti-China moves risk pushing countries toward China if the US doesn’t offer positive economic alternatives; tariffs and deportations may harm Latin American economies and remittances.

Long-term US success requires comprehensive policies: tackle demand for illicit drugs, disrupt financial flows, strengthen governance and economic opportunity, and combine pressure with partnership to prevent erosion of US influence.