The Global South and Relationship with China

The Geopolitics of the Global South Competition

Great-power competition—especially U.S. pressure to force developing countries into binary choices between the West and China—is counterproductive. Many countries in the global South prefer strategic autonomy and multiple alignments rather than being coerced. China’s large-scale economic engagement (notably the Belt and Road Initiative) and narrative of “mutual respect” have made it an attractive partner, while Western retreat in aid and inconsistent policies have weakened U.S. soft power. Although China’s projects have problems (debt, governance, local opposition), Beijing adapts and offers tangible alternatives. Global South states generally want flexibility, fear any single-country hegemony (including China’s), and reject forced bloc politics—preferring a multipolar, multi-order world.

The dynamics of the 21st-century international order are not preordained. Neither a U.S.-led liberal order nor a China-dominated alternative will automatically prevail. Instead, the future will be shaped by a contest of policies and narratives that influence how developing countries perceive their options. Heavy-handed pressure that seeks to force binary choices is likely to backfire, reinforcing the very multipolarity it aims to prevent.
For the West, the strategic priority should be to offer credible, competitive, and respectful alternatives that meet the tangible needs of the Global South, while remaining open to pragmatic cooperation with China on shared challenges. For developing countries, preserving policy space and cultivating diverse partnerships remains the rational path to development, resilience, and autonomy. If major powers learn to accommodate these preferences rather than deny them, the world is more likely to evolve into a stable, pluralistic order in which multiple nodes of power coexist and cooperate—imperfectly, but productively—on the problems that no single state can solve alone.

Key points

• U.S. tactics that pressure developing countries to choose sides risk pushing them toward China and reinforcing anti-Western alignment.
• China’s Belt and Road and large investments respond to South’s concrete needs, giving it influence despite project flaws and criticism.
• Many global South countries value strategic autonomy and multi-alignment, engaging with both U.S. security relationships and Chinese economic offers.
• China promotes a non-universalist narrative (development, respect) that resonates, while Western soft-power decline weakens the appeal of choosing the West.
• Global South does not want a China-centric replacement order; it prefers multiple options to avoid dependence on any single great power.

 Global South and Problems with Chinese Relationship

Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged zero tariffs for the world’s least-developed countries while promoting advanced manufacturing and export growth at the China-Africa summit. But as China shifts production toward higher-end goods and ramps up exports, emerging markets fear a new “China Shock”: cheap Chinese goods and subsidized exports are prompting anti-dumping duties and protectionist measures across Asia, Latin America, and Africa. That creates a dilemma for Beijing — sustain export-driven recovery at home or risk alienating key developing partners — and an opportunity for Western powers to build a common agenda with the global South.

China’s renewed export dynamism offers both opportunities and risks for the global South. The right combination of diplomacy, multilateral rules, and domestic policy adjustments can convert competitive pressures into productive upgrading and deeper cooperation. Without careful management, however, the current wave of inexpensive Chinese exports risks provoking protectionist backlashes that fragment markets and slow development worldwide. Policymakers everywhere should act now to steer this transition toward inclusive, sustainable outcomes rather than escalating confrontation.

Key points

• Xi announced tariff-free access for least-developed countries, contrasting China’s pro-trade messaging with Western protectionism.
• A surge in Chinese exports (including EVs, solar, steel and intermediate goods) is prompting anti-dumping duties and import restrictions from emerging economies (Indonesia, Chile, India, Mexico, Brazil, Thailand).
• The scale and breadth of China’s exports differ from past episodes, risking premature deindustrialization and harming fragile manufacturing in developing countries.
• China faces a strategic trade-off: sustain export-led growth to stabilize its economy and regime legitimacy or reduce export push to preserve geopolitical ties with the global South.
• Western tariffs and potential future U.S. policy shifts (e.g., a tougher Trump administration) could further redirect Chinese exports toward emerging markets, intensifying trade tensions and protectionist responses.

Implications for policy and diplomacy

• For China: Beijing will need a more calibrated export strategy. Blanket support for export expansion — through subsidies, state-directed financing, and capacity expansion — risks provoking coordinated trade defenses that would blunt China’s market access and invite political blowback. China could prioritize upgrading domestic demand, encouraging higher value-added exports rather than volume-driven low-margin goods, and negotiating sector-specific agreements with partner countries to smooth transitions (for example joint-venture industrial upgrades, technology transfer safeguards, or phased liberalization timetables).
• For developing-country governments: Policymakers in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia face competing incentives. Cheap Chinese inputs and consumer goods help contain inflation and support downstream industries in the short run, but large-scale import surges can crowd out nascent local producers. Governments should strengthen trade adjustment measures: temporary safeguards, targeted support for affected sectors (retooling grants, training, tax incentives), and industrial policies that encourage climbing the value chain rather than protectionism alone. Regional cooperation on rules of origin and harmonized anti-dumping standards could reduce costly unilateral measures and avoid retaliatory spirals.
• For advanced economies: Western capitals seeking to build influence in the global South should avoid simplistic “decouple or subsidize” narratives. Instead, they can offer complementary partnerships: finance for infrastructure that supports domestic value addition, technology partnerships that include capacity-building and local manufacturing clauses, and trade policies that reward high labor/environmental standards without becoming de facto protectionism. Multilateral reform efforts (WTO dispute-settlement improvements, clearer subsidy disciplines) remain essential to manage systemic tensions.

Economic outlook

• Short term (6–18 months): Expect episodic trade frictions as more countries impose temporary safeguards or anti-dumping duties. Export growth from China may slow in affected sectors, but overall export volumes could remain high as firms redirect to permissive markets. Commodity-importing developing countries may see short-lived relief in inflation, while manufacturers in vulnerable industries face intensified competition.
• Medium term (2–5 years): Two divergent paths are possible. If China successfully pivots toward higher-value exports and domestic consumption, pressures on low-end producers abroad will ease, enabling some recipient countries to develop their own upstream capabilities with targeted support. Conversely, if Beijing doubles down on price-competitive strategies and Western markets remain partially closed, the battle for third-market share will intensify, prompting deeper protectionist clustering and possible regional trade realignments.
• Long term (5+ years): The ultimate outcome depends on policy choices on all sides. Managed well, the dynamics could accelerate industrial upgrading globally through technology diffusion, regional value chains, and coordinated financing for capacity building. Mismanaged, they could lead to entrenched protectionism, slower global growth, and fractured supply chains that hurt both consumers and producers worldwide.

How China Promotes Authoritarnism in the Global South

An Atlantic Council report analyzed 795 Chinese government training-program descriptions (MOFCOM files) for 2021–2022 and finds Beijing is using official training for foreign officials across the Global South to export governance lessons that bolster authoritarian practices. Programs—organized by many ministries and Party organs, often online during the pandemic—mix technical topics (port management, BeiDou, blockchain, agriculture, etc.) with explicit or implicit lessons about CCP governance, praising China’s political model and linking economic success to authoritarian control. Trainings also require participant reports, yielding useful intelligence and relationship-building opportunities for China. The programs may shift host-country elites’ views, normalize top-down state control, enable surveillance/ security cooperation, and feed China’s broader global narrative campaign promoting autocratic alternatives to liberal democracy.

China’s official training programs for foreign officials represent a multifaceted tool of statecraft: capacity building and soft-power outreach on the surface, intelligence collection and influence cultivation beneath. The 2021–2022 MOFCOM dataset shows systematic use of training to disseminate governance practices aligned with CCP priorities, to normalize authoritarian approaches across technical domains, and to create durable person-to-person linkages that can favor Chinese economic and security interests. Democracies and multilateral actors should respond with a mix of transparency, alternative programming, targeted safeguards, and sustained research to ensure that capacity-building does not unintentionally erode governance standards or enable repressive technologies abroad.

Key points

• Dataset and scope: 795 MOFCOM training descriptions (2021–2022), 21,123 online participants; programs subcontracted to 111 hosting entities and run by at least 11 ministries/Party departments (e.g., ILD, Public Security, Commerce, Science & Tech).
• Mixed content strategy: Many trainings blend technical subjects with CCP governance narratives—poverty alleviation, COVID management, Party leadership virtues—thereby normalizing authoritarian methods even in nonpolitical fields.
• Categories and scale: Authorial coding put 25% of courses as “clearly authoritarian,” 10% “potentially authoritarian,” 22% infrastructure/resource-related, 5% security-related, 2% information-operation, 35% other.
• Intelligence and influence: Participants must submit pre- and post-course reports, providing China with up-to-date political/technical intelligence and identifying local collaborators; trainings build ties that can lock in economic and political influence.
• Global implications and recommendations: The effort promotes an alternative, authoritarian-first development narrative that could erode democratic norms, fragment cooperation on issues like internet governance, and strengthen elite capture in recipient states. Recommendations include building independent, local expertise on China, debriefing officials who attend PRC trainings, increasing objective information on China’s current realities, and targeted research to measure actual impact in recipient countries.

China’s Global South Priority versus the European Union

Beijing has reprioritized its diplomacy toward the “Global South,” deepening ties with Asia, Africa, Latin America and Russia, and treating the EU as a secondary, non‑priority partner. This long‑term strategy—reminiscent of a modernized “Three Worlds” approach—aims to build a coalition that challenges Western influence and reshape global governance, so Europe should not expect big concessions and must prepare to counter China’s coalition‑building and anti‑Western narratives.

China’s prioritization of the Global South and its view of Europe as a secondary actor mean the upcoming EU‑China summit is unlikely to produce sweeping concessions to European demands. Brussels should recalibrate expectations, sharpen negotiating priorities, and invest in strategies that strengthen European leverage: unity, multilateral partnerships, credible alternatives for partner countries, and robust defence of strategic economic interests. By treating the summit as one tactical engagement in a much longer strategic competition, the EU can avoid surprise, reduce risks to its interests, and better shape the evolving global order.

Key points

• Beijing has intensified outreach to the Global South (Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, Caribbean) with new credit lines, tariff deals and diplomatic tours, while also deepening ties with Russia.
• China treats the EU as a useful but lower‑priority actor, often seeing Europe as part of “the West,” and therefore is unlikely to make major concessions on market access, overcapacity, rare earths, or Ukraine.
• The approach echoes a modernized version of Mao’s “Three Worlds” theory: prioritizing a coalition of non‑Western states to counterbalance the US and its allies.
• Europe should recognize this long‑game strategy, prepare for tougher negotiations, and develop policies to counter China’s coalition‑building and antagonistic narratives.

Recommended European responses

• Clarify objectives and prioritize demands. Given limited leverage, EU leaders should focus on a short list of achievable priorities for the summit (e.g., narrow, enforceable commitments on investment screening, transparency in state‑owned enterprise activity, and clearer protocols for industrial subsidies) rather than broad, maximalist expectations that Beijing will not meet.
• Strengthen unity and strategic communication. The EU must present a united front — both in public messaging and behind closed doors — to avoid bilateral deals that Beijing can exploit. EU institutions should coordinate with member states to deliver consistent, well‑timed messaging that highlights where China’s behavior conflicts with shared European values and interests.
• Deepen partnerships with like‑minded states. Intensify coordination with the United States, Japan, Australia, India, and selected partners in the Global South on trade defence, export controls, and investment rules. Multilateralizing responses will raise the political cost for Beijing of unilateral or coercive economic tactics and reduce the effectiveness of China’s divide‑and‑rule approach.
• Offer attractive alternatives to China’s deals for the Global South. The EU should step up targeted development finance, trade preferences, and infrastructure packages — calibrated, results‑oriented, and transparent — that compete with Chinese financing while advancing sustainability and governance standards. Partnering with multilateral development banks and private capital can stretch limited EU resources further.
• Harden economic safeguards while keeping selective engagement. Expand and enforce tools such as anti‑subsidy measures, screening of foreign direct investment, and public procurement safeguards. At the same time, preserve channels for cooperation on global public goods (climate, health, scientific collaboration) where mutual interests remain; decoupling in entirety would be costly and unnecessary.
• Anticipate and rebut disinformation and narrative offensives. Invest in strategic communication to expose predatory aspects of some Chinese deals and to explain Europe’s alternative offers. Support independent media and civil society in partner countries to increase transparency around infrastructure and financing projects.
• Prepare contingency plans for geopolitical risks. Given the deepening China‑Russia partnership and Beijing’s willingness to prioritize strategic alignments over European concerns, the EU should plan for scenarios that include energy supply shocks, coordinated diplomatic pushes against EU positions in international fora, and pressure on technological supply chains.

Political and economic bargaining chips the EU can realistically use

• Trade leverage: While the EU’s market is tempting for China, general access is unlikely to be traded away. However, the EU can target specific sectors with strict standards and limited market openings tied to enforceable reforms (e.g., procurement access in limited, high‑value areas).
• Investment screening and reciprocity measures: Strengthening and coordinating screening rules across member states, and pushing for reciprocity in market access for European investors, can yield concessions without wholesale access demands.
• Regulatory standards: The EU can export high regulatory standards (sustainability, labour, digital privacy) as preconditions for market access, nudging Chinese firms to comply if they want to operate in Europe.
• Multilateral forums and norm‑setting: Lead coalitions to shape rules at the WTO, OECD, G20 and other bodies that increase transparency and discipline state subsidies and cross‑border economic practices.
• Conditional cooperation: Offer selective, high‑visibility cooperation on climate and health in exchange for verifiable steps on transparency and supply‑chain resilience.

Risks if Europe underestimates Beijing’s pivot

• Strategic surprise: Expect limited reciprocity and possible use of the summit as a platform for China to showcase Global South partnerships rather than to concede on European priorities.
• Fragmentation pressure: Beijing will continue to exploit bilateral economic dependencies to split EU member states and weaken collective bargaining power.
• Influence erosion in the Global South: If Europe does not present credible alternatives, China’s moral and material influence across Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia will grow, diminishing European diplomatic leverage on global issues.
• Normative contestation: A longer‑term contest over governance models and norms — economic sovereignty, digital governance, and development finance standards — could shift global institutions away from liberal, rules‑based norms.

The Global South Relationship with Russia

Russia remains an attractive partner for many Global South countries because it offers military hardware, energy, and political alternatives to Western dominance without the threat of territorial expansion. Its geography, history, and current capabilities make it a useful “third” great power that helps emerging states avoid a binary Cold War–style alignment between the U.S. and China. As Washington pressures countries to punish Russia, many in Africa, Asia, and Latin America prefer a multipolar order that preserves strategic space and transactional ties with Moscow.

Russia’s appeal in the Global South is rooted in a mix of practical offerings—arms, energy, and political cover—and a geopolitical environment in which many developing countries value strategic autonomy. For the United States, the challenge is less to “win” every partner outright than to provide credible, competitive alternatives and to engage in patient, interest-driven diplomacy that respects the agency of Global South actors. Managing the balance between deterring malign behavior and offering constructive cooperation will determine whether Moscow remains a durable third pole or gradually recedes as its economic and geopolitical limits tighten.

Key points

• Many Global South states refused to join strict sanctions on Russia in 2022, citing complex causes of the war, Western double standards, and food/energy security concerns.
• Russia provides crucial arms, energy (oil, gas, fertilizers), and nuclear projects to several developing countries and has stepped into security roles (notably parts of Africa).
• Geography and history reduce fears of Russian territorial aggression for most Global South actors; Russia is weaker than the U.S. and China but strong enough to balance them.
• Multipolarity (a viable third great power) is preferred by many Global South states because it expands strategic choices and avoids polarizing binary blocs or a G-2 domination.
• Russia’s outreach—deepening ties with India, Vietnam, parts of Africa, and other players—helps it appear less isolated and more useful as a counterweight to U.S. primacy.

Implications for U.S. policy

• Reassess assumptions about automatic alignment. Washington should not assume that Global South partners will side with it simply because of shared development goals or security ties. Many of these states value autonomy and issue-based cooperation more than ideological solidarity. U.S. policymakers need to recognize that pressure campaigns aimed at isolating Russia can backfire if they are perceived as attempts to enforce Western norms or punish partners for pragmatic engagements.
• Offer attractive, practical alternatives. Where Russia is supplying arms, energy, or infrastructure, the U.S. and its allies should present feasible, cost-competitive options rather than moralizing critiques. That means improving financing, hastening delivery times, and reducing bureaucratic obstacles for projects that bolster food, energy, and security resilience. Supporting multinational solutions (e.g., pooled procurement, regional energy grids, concessional finance) will be more effective than insisting partners choose sides.
• Prioritize issue-specific cooperation. Many Global South countries are open to working with both Russia and the West on narrow, technocratic areas—public health, climate adaptation, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping—without forming broader strategic alignments. U.S. policy should exploit these windows to deepen practical ties while avoiding attempts to micromanage partners’ broader diplomatic choices.
• Strengthen multilateral institutions and norms. To preserve leverage over global governance, the U.S. should invest in reforming and strengthening international institutions that matter to developing countries—trade, development finance, health, and climate—so that they deliver demonstrable benefits and are seen as responsive to Global South priorities. This reduces the relative appeal of bilateral Russian offers and counters narratives of Western neglect.
• Adopt a patient, strategic narrative. Rather than framing Russia as an existential threat to all Global South states, U.S. diplomacy should acknowledge legitimate concerns about Western double standards and emphasize long-term benefits of cooperating with democracies on transparent, sustainable partnerships. Messaging should highlight shared interests (economic growth, stability, climate resilience) and present the U.S. as a reliable, less predatory partner.

Risks and limitations of Russia’s appeal

• Economic constraints. Russia’s economy is smaller and less diversified than those of the U.S., EU, China, or India. While it can offer military hardware and energy deals, it lacks the deep financial and technological resources to deliver large-scale civilian development projects at the pace and scale many Global South states desire.
• Overreliance on coercive tools. Russian influence often rests on security ties and arms transfers, which can entangle partners in conflicts, undermine domestic governance, or provoke Western countermeasures that damage local economies (e.g., secondary sanctions). For some states, the short-term gains of Russian military assistance may be outweighed by long-term costs.
• Legitimacy and reputational questions. Russia’s association with mercenaries, disputed interventions, and authoritarian practices can create reputational risks for partners seeking broader international legitimacy. This constrains Russia’s ability to become a normative model or a comprehensive development partner.
• Vulnerability to geopolitical setbacks. Moscow’s capacity to sustain influence depends on continued access to energy revenue and diplomatic space. Prolonged conflict, sanctions, or a shift in global energy markets could erode the resources Russia uses to court the Global South.