Russian Drone Incursions of NATO Airspace Test Alliance

Putin Tests NATO Countries and Article 5 Commitment

Article 5 of NATO says that an attack on one is an attack on all. This is the bedrock commitment made by all NATO members. Putin is trying to sow doubt among how strong this commitment is among NATO states and also doubt weather the US would back them. In short, to weaken the alliance.

Vladimir Putin is running a calibrated grey‑zone campaign against NATO and Europe — using drones, cyber‑attacks, airspace violations, propaganda and sabotage — to unsettle Western unity without provoking full-scale war. His aims are to fracture NATO and cast doubt on US commitment, raise the political and material cost of supporting Ukraine, and discredit liberal democracies at home and abroad. Western governments need to expose and attribute attacks quickly, build resilience (redundancies, sensors, repair teams, cheap drone interceptors, cyber defences, hardened elections) and impose clearer costs (sanctions, cyber countermeasures, use frozen assets) to deter escalation.

Key points

• Putin’s grey‑zone tactics are cheap, deniable and intended to avoid a direct NATO confrontation while steadily undermining Western resolve.
• Objectives: weaken NATO unity and US commitment; pressure Europe into reducing support for Ukraine; and sow discord to strengthen authoritarian rivals such as Russia and China.
• Examples: drone incursions in Poland, MiG flights over Estonia, undersea cable damage, cyber-attacks on airports and defence firms, election interference and propaganda bot swarms.
• Recommended response: rapid public attribution, greater resilience (logistics, spares, cyber teams, election protection), continuous patrols and sensors, affordable counter‑drone weapons, and tougher costs (sanctions, cyber retaliation, using frozen Russian assets for defence).
• The ambiguity of attribution and risk of escalation create a “defender’s dilemma”: respond firmly and risk escalation, or refrain and invite further probing and allied division.
• US policy uncertainty under President Trump fuels European disagreements on response and concerns about American credibility; that uncertainty may encourage adversaries.

Recent Drone Incursions into Denmark

Denmark, a strong backer of Ukraine, faces security concerns after a series of drone overflights of sensitive sites—including airports and a main air base—during a major EU summit in Copenhagen. The incidents, attributed by many European officials to Russian hybrid tactics (though Denmark has not publicly blamed Moscow), come after Denmark’s recent shift to supply long‑range weapons and fund Ukrainian arms production. The episodes have prompted short-term security measures, international assistance with counter‑drone defences, and renewed debates about Europe’s unified response to Russian aggression.

Key points

• Drone incursions briefly closed several Danish airports and flew over Skrydstrup air base; authorities say operators appeared “professional.”
• The incidents coincided with Denmark’s leading role at an EU summit and follow Copenhagen’s move to acquire long‑range precision weapons and support Ukrainian arms production (the “Danish model”).
• Denmark hasn’t publicly blamed Russia but officials and analysts link the events to broader Russian hybrid tactics aimed at deterring European support for Ukraine.
• Allies provided antidrone systems and experts for the summit; Denmark imposed a temporary nationwide civilian‑drone ban.
• EU leaders continue broad support for Ukraine, planning financial transfers from frozen Russian assets, more funding for Kyiv (including drones), and new sanctions on Russia.

 Threats to Europe and NATO from Russian Shadow Fleet

 In fact French athorities have siezed a ship that may have been involved in launching drones recently in Denmark. According to data from the Economist and S&P Global, the Russians have close to a shadow fleet of 600 ships that represents a threat discussed below.

NATO navies and maritime authorities are struggling to contain a growing “shadow fleet” of vessels that hide identities to smuggle oil, evade sanctions, spy and sabotage undersea infrastructure. The practice—turning off tracking transponders, flag-hopping and using opaque shell companies—has multiplied since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and now accounts for a significant share of tankers. Baltic states and NATO have launched measures (new patrols, Baltic Sentry, legal and diplomatic pressure, targeted inspections) that have reduced incidents, but legal limits, porous registries and complex ownership networks make enforcement difficult and the phenomenon is likely to persist.

Key points

• Shadow-fleet growth: “Going dark,” false flags and rapid re-registration have surged since 2022; about 19% of the global oil-tanker fleet now operates in shadowy ways per S&P Global.
• Wide tactics and actors: Not just state-controlled ships—opportunistic networks, shell companies and middlemen exploit weak governance; similar tactics used by North Korea, Iran and Venezuela.
• Operational incidents: Shadow vessels implicated in oil-smuggling, drone attacks that closed airports in Denmark, and undersea cable cutting (e.g., Eagle S in the Gulf of Finland).
• NATO and national responses: New missions (Baltic Sentry), rotating naval groups, inspections, and legal tools (Estonia’s law to attack vessels harming infrastructure) have improved deterrence but are constrained by international law on innocent passage.
• Enforcement challenges: Opaque ownership, multiple/phony registries, flag‑hopping and digital identity changes make attribution and prosecution difficult; experts warn the trend will endure.