Munich Security Conference: US and EU Relations

Implications for US and EU Transatlantic Ties

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking at the Munich Security Conference, urged closer US–Europe cooperation to build a “new Western century,” framing the relationship as a civilisational partnership. He criticized liberal policies—especially on migration and climate—and called for reshoring supply chains, protecting critical minerals, and strengthening defence ties. His speech echoed the Trump administration’s hardline tone and has drawn concern that Washington is pressuring Europe to align with US priorities, potentially empowering far‑right agendas. European leaders broadly welcomed the call for stronger transatlantic ties while some analysts warned it risks subordinating Europe’s autonomy and values.

The US message at the 2026 Munich Security Conference conveyed through Rubio was to acknowledge strains in the post–World War II, U.S.-led rules-based order and to call for reform rather than abandonment. Marco Rubio traced the origins of those strains to post–Cold War globalization and the unintended empowerment of state-led rivals (implicitly China). Rubio urged rebuilding institutions with European partners while stressing the U.S. will act if necessary. His tone sought recalibration and reassurance after a series of confrontational U.S. moves and earlier transatlantic friction. Key points:

• Rubio called for a US–Europe “new Western century,” focusing on defence, industrial reshoring, critical-minerals supply chains, AI and space, and stricter migration policies.
• He blamed “liberalist” policies and mass migration for weakening Western cohesion and criticised climate policies he said harm people.
• Critics see Rubio’s rhetoric as part of the Trump administration’s civilisational framing that could encourage far‑right politics and pressure Europe to adopt US priorities.
• European leaders applauded the call for stronger ties but emphasized an independent, rules-based Europe; analysts warn this reveals tensions over Europe’s strategic autonomy.
• Rubio blamed strategic miscalculations after the Cold War—overreliance on economic integration and the assumption liberalization would follow—leading to weakened Western industrial bases and greater geopolitical competition.
• His critique implicitly targeted China: state subsidies, industrial policy, military modernization, cyber operations, and influence efforts have challenged the existing order.
• S. strategy emphasizes deterrence and renewal (not direct confrontation), reflected in recent policy documents and actions across Venezuela, Greenland, Iran, and defense posture.
• Rubio advocated reforming international institutions in partnership with Europe rather than dismantling them, but deep transatlantic alignment remains uncertain amid trade, climate, and security disagreements.

Strategic Implications for US EU Defense Ties

European countries are expanding weapons production but remain deeply dependent on U.S. strategic enablers (intelligence, logistics, space, command-and-control, and specialized platforms). Political hurdles in the EU, high costs, and long timelines mean a rapid, full “decoupling” from American military capabilities is unrealistic. The EU and NATO are pursuing projects (Strategic Compass, IRIS², procurement cooperation, new air/air-defense options) to close gaps, but many critical capabilities — especially space-based ISR, mid-air refueling, strategic airlift, and integrated C2 — will take years and large investment to replace.

In addition, talk of replacing the US nuclear shield for Europe is just that talk. However, having a plan B is a good idea. France and the UK are central to discussions about a European nuclear “plan B”: better coordination of existing arsenals, potential stationing or shared missions, and increased participation in NATO nuclear planning. Creating new national nuclear forces across Europe is technically possible but impractical: it would be extremely expensive, violate non‑proliferation commitments, require major political shifts, and carry high escalation risks. More feasible responses include bolstering conventional and precision strike capabilities to deter or blunt Russian aggression, and limited nuclear cooperation between France and the UK rather than a continent‑wide independent deterrent. Key points

• Dependence on U.S. enablers: Europe manufactures weapons (tanks, jets, missiles) but still relies on U.S. intelligence, logistics, satellites, and command-and-control to make them effective.
• Political and financial barriers: EU unanimity rules, vetoes (e.g., Hungary), and the enormous estimated cost (potentially up to 10% of GDP or ~$1 trillion overall) make rapid independence impractical.
• Ongoing European efforts: The EU’s Strategic Compass and national procurements aim to boost autonomy — examples include Saab GlobalEye / E-7A debates for AWACS replacement, SAMP-T as Patriot alternatives, Airbus A400M airlift, and IRIS² for satellite communications.
• Major capability gaps remain: Europe lags in space launch capacity, mid-air refueling tankers, full-spectrum ISR and intelligence fusion, and integrated NATO C2 — all critical for deterring or defending against Russia.
• Long timeline and trade-offs: Building “strategic enablers” is time-consuming and expensive; successes require political coherence, pooled procurement, and sustained investment rather than quick fixes.
• EU leaders emphasize caution: building a European nuclear deterrent would be enormously costly, politically fraught, and legally complex, so more realistic options focus on deeper UK–France coordination, extended French protection, and beefing up advanced conventional strike capabilities.

The European Fighter-Jet Partnership on Verge of Failure

Europe’s ambitious Future Combat Air System (FCAS), launched in 2017 to build a sixth‑generation fighter, is close to collapse because of deep Franco‑German disagreements over workshare, control and intellectual property—not technical problems. France’s Dassault prefers centralized leadership and to protect IP; Germany and partners want broader industrial participation and capability development. With rising defence budgets, Germany and Airbus may pursue alternative paths (including partnerships with Sweden’s Saab), while smaller, pragmatic projects like the European Long‑Range Strike Approach (ELSA) and the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) are advancing. The episode highlights how growing national budgets and competing industrial priorities make large, complex European defence collaborations harder. Key points related to difficult of common European defense industry:

• FCAS aimed to replace Rafale and Typhoon and create a “combat cloud” with drones; political friction and disputes over roles (Dassault vs Airbus/Indra) have paralysed the programme.
• France positions Dassault as lead and guards intellectual property; Germany wants wider industrial development and resists a junior‑partner role.
• France has already pulled funding from related drone work; other Franco‑German projects (tank, maritime patrol) have also stalled or failed.
• Alternatives: Airbus may pursue its own heavier fighter with Saab; smaller, looser coalitions (ELSA for missiles) and procurement pools (ESSI for air defence) are progressing and may be more practical than large joint development programmes.
• Rising defence budgets may reduce the incentive to cooperate, increasing industry fragmentation across Europe.