Israel and Arab Foreign Relations and Geopolitics of Middle East

Israeli Strike on Qatar Threatens Israeli-Arab Normalization

Israeli strike on Qatar would mark a dangerous new phase in a long-running cycle of conflict and shaky diplomacy across the Middle East. It risks undermining fragile normalisation gains, empowering hardliners and proxies, and triggering economic and humanitarian fallout. The only viable long-term remedy is a combination of urgent de-escalation measures and renewed political engagement aimed at addressing core grievances, particularly the Palestinian question, to restore a path toward regional stability.

To understand the current geopolitical context at play in the Middle East, we take at look at past normalization efforts, The Abraham Accords, in light of current Israeli actions.

Israel’s recent airstrike on Qatar risks widening rifts with Arab states and adds to a long record of conflict and uneasy diplomacy since Israel’s 1948 founding. Relations between Israel and key Arab countries vary from full peace treaties (Egypt, Jordan) and recent normalization (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan) to open hostility (Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen). The Gaza war and Israeli actions — including settlement expansion and strikes affecting Gulf states and Iran-aligned groups — have strained progress toward broader regional normalisation.

Key points

• Egypt and Jordan signed long-standing peace treaties (1978 Camp David; 1994 Jordan) but domestic opposition and Palestinian concerns keep ties cautious.
• The UAE and Bahrain normalised with Israel under the 2020 Abraham Accords; Morocco and Sudan also moved toward ties, though conflict and politics have limited progress.
• Saudi Arabia has kept the door open to normalisation conditioned on a viable Palestinian state per the Arab Peace Initiative, but the Gaza war and regional tensions have made that less likely.
• Syria, Lebanon (Hezbollah), Iraq and Yemen remain hostile fronts: Israel and Iran-aligned forces have clashed across these theatres, with repeated strikes and proxy attacks.
• Israel’s strike on Qatar, a fellow Gulf Cooperation Council member and mediator, risks further destabilising Gulf relations already affected by Gaza, settlements and regional security concerns.

Thus, the question is why did it happen? In short, Israel decided that pursuing further diplomatic efforts with Hamas would bear no fruit. This is even though the US and Qatar were working on diplomatic efforts with the political wing of Hamas in Doha, Qatar.

Is Israel overplaying its hand?

While Israeli operations have weakened regional foes like Hezbollah and altered dynamics in Syria, Israel’s insistence on unconditional “victory,” heavy-handed tactics in Gaza, and restrictive aid policies have worsened the humanitarian crisis, isolated Israel diplomatically, and risked undermining longer-term security gains.

Key points

• U.S.–Israel policy differences: Both U.S. presidents pledged support, but U.S. leaders pushed for ceasefires while Israeli governments pursued a military resolution.
• Regional military gains but risks: IDF operations degraded Hezbollah and constrained Iranian proxies, and contributed to regime change pressures in Syria, yet Israeli overreach (buffer zones, strikes) risks backlash and lost diplomatic opportunities.
• Iran remains resilient: Despite setbacks, Iran persists in nuclear activities and rebuilding proxies (Hezbollah, Houthis, Syria), so it is weakened but not defeated.
• Humanitarian and strategic cost in Gaza: Israel’s siege tactics, stringent aid controls, and incidents obstructing humanitarian relief have produced severe suffering and international condemnation; alternative mechanisms (Gaza Humanitarian Foundation) failed to resolve the problems.
• Alternative approach recommended: Managing the conflict—targeted military action, exploring governance alternatives for Gaza, regional diplomacy, and calibrated deterrence—could reduce civilian suffering, hasten Hamas’s decline, secure hostages’ return, and sustain Israel’s long-term security.

Normalization Efforts at Risk: The Abraham Accords

Five years after the Abraham Accords (Sept 15, 2020), the agreements have helped reshape Middle East diplomacy by advancing Israel’s ties with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and others, producing economic, security and people-to-people gains. Progress accelerated regional cooperation initiatives like the Negev Forum and N7 Initiative, while offering new platforms for trade, technology, and multilateral projects. However, the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks and the ensuing Gaza war, plus public backlash in several countries, have strained momentum. Contributors argue that reviving and institutionalizing multilateral mechanisms (Negev Forum ministerial, expanded working groups, special envoys) and achieving a durable end to the war and a negotiated Iranian nuclear resolution are essential to restore and expand the Accords’ promise.

In short, the Abraham Accords opened a unique window to remap Middle East diplomacy by creating pragmatic, interest-driven partnerships that bypassed the old template of pan-Arab unanimity on the Israel question. The path ahead is neither automatic nor assured: it requires deliberate institution-building, a credible political horizon for the Palestinians, and sustained investments—economic, social, and diplomatic—that make normalization deliver for everyday citizens.

Key points

• Accords’ impact: Substantial growth in trade, investment, travel, security cooperation and people-to-people exchanges (example: Israel–UAE trade and investment increases).
• Regional architecture: Reviving and expanding the Negev Forum/N7 Initiative and creating durable multilateral institutions are needed to institutionalize cooperation and attract new members (Jordan, Palestinian Authority, other Arab/African/Asian observers).
• War’s setback: The October 7 attacks and Gaza war disrupted planned meetings and damaged public support in some states (notably Bahrain, Morocco), but core partnerships (notably UAE–Israel) have largely endured.
• Country perspectives:
• United States: Should invest in multilateral architecture, appoint special envoys, and push to reconvene ministerial summits to regain momentum.
• Israel: Benefits from partnerships beyond military strength; next phase should deepen science, culture, and economic ties.
• UAE: Sees the Accords as fulfilling Sadat’s people-to-people vision and remains committed despite regional pressures.
• Bahrain: Balances strong pro-Palestinian domestic sentiment with pragmatic strategic ties to Israel and the U.S.
• Morocco: Uses normalization as part of a broader pan‑Abrahamist strategy tied to dynastic continuity and security priorities (Western Sahara, military cooperation).
• Forward agenda: End the Gaza war, negotiate on the Iranian nuclear threat, deepen multilateral economic and cultural projects, and sustain long-term investments to make the “warm peace” generationally durable.

Recent Recognition of Palestinian State at the United Nations

Clealy world opinion is swinging against Israel, with the current Israeli government prepared to threaten more settlements in response. The problem is that by recognizing a Palestinian state before a political settlement it risks hardening the Israeli position. Their argument is that this rewards Hamas etc. In reality, the extreme right in Netanhahu’s coalition government never had any intention of creating a Palestinian state.

Many of the countries were under intense domestic pressure to recognize a Palestinian state. It should be seen as sybolic gesture at the moment with no effect on ground.  However, key countries like France, the United Kingdom and Canada plus others went forward with an announcement.

Our view is that once Hamas is contained or destroyed further, pressure will mount on Israel from two directions. First, the threat will be greatly diminished and it would be difficult to support further. Already the cabinet, has dissagreements on the recent foray into Gaza. These cracks in policy are likely to widen with a decreasing threat. Second, the carrot of normalization with Saudi Arabia, the biggest prize for Israel. For this to happen, some sort of road map of a Palestinian State needs to be implimented. Otherwise, it would be difficult for the Saudis to normalize relations. The US, of course, would further push the prize of Saudi normalization. In addition, US support with a diminished or eliminated threat of Hamas will dissapear.

In short, as Hamas is weakened or eliminated, we see the propects of peace and normalization getting better. Thus, expect things to get really ugly in the short-term unfortunately.