Iran War: US Allies and NATO

Trump to Rethink NATO Commitment

President Trump publicly questioned whether the United States should “rethink” its NATO commitment after European allies refused to join a U.S.-led military push against Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. His frustration stems from political support without operational commitment from NATO partners. A subsequent energy shock — crude and gas price spikes after attacks on regional energy infrastructure — forced several European countries to offer limited, qualified help to secure shipping lanes, but they refused to endorse or join a wider war. The episode exposed deep fractures in transatlantic trust and consultation, and raised doubts about burden-sharing, the legitimacy of U.S. decisions to use force, and the future cohesion of the alliance. Key points:

• Trump expressed anger at NATO allies for not committing forces to a U.S.-led operation against Iran; he left open the possibility of reassessing U.S. NATO membership.
• Europeans broadly condemned Iranian attacks and later agreed in guarded terms to help ensure freedom of navigation but avoided endorsing or joining a U.S.-Israeli military campaign.
• The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and strikes on energy infrastructure (including major LNG facilities) triggered a severe global energy shock — oil and gas prices surged, and Europe faces acute gas storage shortfalls and inflationary risk.
• Central and Eastern European states (e.g., Poland, Baltic countries) are torn between loyalty to the U.S. and reluctance to commit forces without clear legal basis, objectives, or exit plans; Hungary opportunistically tied support to other demands.
• Beyond the immediate crisis, the episode highlighted erosion of trust, poor consultation on decisions of war, and a potentially long-lasting strain on NATO’s cohesion and burden-sharing.

Iran War Exposes NATO Political Divisions

The Iran crisis has accelerated a long-running shift: NATO is becoming more “Europeanised,” with Europe taking greater military responsibility and cooperation even as the US acts unilaterally or erratically. Despite political divisions over the Iran conflict and strains with the Trump administration, Europeans have increased spending, deepened bilateral and multilateral defence ties, and begun assuming more NATO command roles — trends likely to continue regardless of the conflict’s outcome.

The Israeli–U.S. attack on Iran has exposed deep rifts between the United States and key European allies, risking the coherence of NATO. European governments and publics are increasingly refusing to support U.S. military actions (closing airspace, denying basing/refueling), driven by opposition to the war, declining support for Israel, and distrust of President Trump. If the conflict continues, economic harm to Europe and political backlash could push more countries to distance themselves from U.S. defense commitments and precipitate a major realignment of transatlantic relations.

For example, Spain is the most anti-US policy on Iran. European leaders (e.g., Germany’s AfD spokesman, Spain, Italy, France) and publics are refusing U.S. military support for the Iran campaign, citing sovereignty and opposition to the war. Consistent Trump’s insults, threats (Greenland), and unilateral approach deepened European hostility and reduced willingness to cooperate; many Europeans view U.S. actions as unconsulted and unjustified. There is widespread European public opposition to Israel’s actions (especially among youth) amplifies refusal to back U.S.-led strikes on Iran. Key points:

• The Iran war exposed NATO political divisions: the US moved unilaterally at times, several major European states kept distance, and allies differed on direct involvement.
• Political strain with the Trump administration risks further transatlantic friction and could shape NATO dynamics before the next summit.
• Europeans are reducing military dependence on the US: rising defence budgets, many bilateral partnerships (135 between 2022–2025), EU cooperation, and more European command roles in NATO.
• The US is not exiting but is deliberately shifting oversight (e.g., handing NATO Joint Force Command roles to European allies), reflecting a planned rebalancing of responsibility.
• Three lasting trends: a developing European security architecture (EU + Europeanised NATO + clustered defence), strategic focus shifting east/north, and the need for European strategic autonomy rather than hoping the US will resume steady leadership.

European NATO Partners Not Ready to Help

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz exposed a long-standing strategic failure: decades of U.S. tactical preparedness were not matched by a shared, strategic NATO framework to deter, manage, and absorb the global economic and political fallout from an Iran-led asymmetric disruption. When hostilities erupted after U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran in February 2026, Iran deployed mines, missiles, and fast boats that quickly choked shipping and sent oil and gas markets into turmoil. The U.S. military responded, but NATO was unprepared to take on a meaningful role. U.S. presidential public attacks on allies deepened the rift, misdiagnosed the problem as cowardice, and handed Iran propaganda advantages. The need for honest, institutional fixes: joint planning, pre-authorized command arrangements, shared intelligence and doctrine, and U.S. leadership rooted in consultation and cohesion rather than coercion.

In short, the U.S. long relied on tactical military dominance and assumed it could unilaterally reopen Hormuz; it never built a NATO-level strategic framework for deterrence, energy-shock management, or Gulf coordination. Iran’s rapid asymmetric campaign (mines, shore missiles, fast boats) in 2026 quickly immobilized tankers, spiked oil and gas prices, and showed the real-world consequences analysts warned about. NATO recognized the risk but treated Hormuz as “out of area”; it lacked doctrine, pre-positioned assets, and command arrangements to respond effectively. Unhelpful U.S. presidential public accusations of allied “cowardice” worsened cohesion, misattributed causes, and provided Tehran a propaganda win. Remedy: develop shared doctrine and planning, pre-authorized command and burden-sharing mechanisms, an integrated intelligence/maritime architecture, and U.S. leadership based on consultation and trust rather than public humiliation.

Middle East Allies: UAE Signals Intent to Help Open Hormuz

A WSJ report states that the United Arab Emirates is preparing to back a U.S.-led or international military effort to reopen the Strait of Hormuz after repeated Iranian missile and drone attacks on Emirati territory. Abu Dhabi is pushing for a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing such action and is urging U.S., European, and Asian partners to form a coalition. Emirati officials say they have reviewed capabilities to help clear mines, provide support services and potentially use bases and ports as staging areas, while stressing operations would be coordinated and lawful. The move marks a major policy shift for the U.A.E. and carries significant risks, including further Iranian retaliation and long-term regional tensions. Key points:

• The U.A.E. is lobbying for a U.N. Security Council resolution to authorize action to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and is urging formation of an international coalition.
• Abu Dhabi says it has reviewed capabilities to assist (mine-clearing, support services) and could provide bases/ports (e.g., Jebel Ali) and assets for operations.
• The shift follows repeated Iranian missile and drone strikes on the U.A.E., which have damaged tourism, air traffic and investor confidence.
• Risks include escalated Iranian attacks on Emirati infrastructure, potential long-term regional tensions, and practical challenges of controlling the strait without occupying adjacent territory.
• Diplomatic obstacles remain (possible Russia/China veto, alternative French proposals) and Gulf states have been reluctant to formally become combatants despite growing frustration with Tehran.