India’s Multi-Alignment Foreign Policy and Limits to US-India Relations

Geopolitical Balancing Act for India’s Foreign Policy

Over the past 25 years U.S. policy toward India relied on an informal doctrine of “strategic altruism”: Washington supported India’s rise expecting long-term benefits—economic markets, a democratic counterweight to China, security cooperation—without demanding immediate returns. That bipartisan approach survived multiple administrations but faces a test under a more transactional, unpredictable second Trump administration that demands reciprocal concessions (trade access, defense purchases, energy and nuclear reforms). India may need to practice its own strategic altruism—making short-term concessions to secure long-term U.S. investment, technology, and security cooperation—despite domestic political risks and its longstanding policy of strategic autonomy.

Key points

• Strategic altruism: Since the early 2000s U.S. policymakers favored helping India rise (civil nuclear deal, Quad, defense and tech cooperation) believing India’s success would serve U.S. interests vs. China.
• Trump 2.0 break: The second Trump administration emphasizes transactional reciprocity, pressing India for tariff cuts, more U.S. arms purchases, energy imports, and nuclear liability changes—marking an end or pause to U.S. strategic altruism.
• India’s calculus: India needs U.S. capital, technology (semiconductors, AI), and security cooperation to meet development and strategic goals; losing U.S. support would raise economic and defense costs vis-à-vis China.
• Domestic trade-offs: Making concessions risks political backlash for Modi and the BJP (especially on agriculture), but tactical reforms could attract investment and integrate India into global supply chains.
• Strategic choice: India must weigh short-term concessions to maintain a vital partnership and hedge against China, accepting uncomfortable compromise to secure long-term national interests.

The era of implicit U.S. “strategic altruism” toward India may be ending as American policy becomes more transactional and demanding. Faced with this shift, India must make a hard strategic choice: cling to doctrinal autonomy and risk losing opportunities for capital, technology, and security cooperation; or accept pragmatic, limited concessions to secure long-term strategic gains. The wiser course is a calibrated mix of short-term give-and-take and long-term capacity building — using concessions as investments in India’s sovereign future rather than signs of subservience. By doing so, India can preserve its strategic independence while securing the tools it needs to compete economically and strategically in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.

Indian Russian Strategy

In short, India is navigating a fraught foreign-policy dilemma between maintaining long-standing ties with Russia and deepening relations with the West. New Delhi practices “strategic autonomy,” balancing defence, energy and economic needs while avoiding a full alignment with either pole. This stance is driven by historical non‑alignment, heavy Russian defence dependence, discounted Russian energy supplies, and concerns about Chinese encirclement — but it risks US sanctions or diplomatic costs and internal debate between realists and pragmatists.

Key points

• Strategic autonomy: India pursues a flexible, multipolar approach rather than choosing a single bloc, seeking to preserve manoeuvre amid shifting great‑power competition.
• Defence and energy drivers: ~60% of India’s military hardware is Russian-origin (S-400, BrahMos, AK-203), and Russian crude supplies are a major, discounted energy source—both cement ties.
• Domestic debate: Realists view Russia as an indispensable security partner against China and possible encirclement; pragmatists favour closer Western ties for technology and economic growth and warn of sanctions risk.
• External pressure and risks: US bills and warnings about secondary sanctions, and Western push for decoupling from Moscow, put India’s doctrine under stress and create a danger of being squeezed between powers.
• Adaptive strategies: India uses alternative payment mechanisms, deepens economic links with the West (Quad, I2U2, Europe, Middle East), and sustains participation in BRICS — attempting to maximize options while minimizing exposure.

Assessment of India’s Russia policy is a high‑wire act: driven by immediate defence and energy needs, historical ties, and regional security imperatives, yet constrained by evolving global norms and Western pressure. The pursuit of strategic autonomy remains feasible but requires proactive diversification, clearer signaling to partners, robust financial mechanisms, and shrewd multilateral diplomacy. How well India manages this balancing act will have significant implications for regional stability, defence architectures, and the broader shape of great‑power competition in Eurasia.

One thing for sure it needs to do is to clarify red lines. New Delhi should articulate clear principles that guide its Russia policy — e.g., military procurement continuity, protection of energy interests, and limits on technology transfers that would undermine Western partnerships — to reduce ambiguity that can provoke punitive responses. The problem is that it is caught in the middle with its multi-alignment foreign policy and if it favors one side over the other trust and cooperation are damaged.

 Understand and Accept the Limits to US-India Relations

Since 2000, the United States has steadily deepened cooperation with India—nuclear, defense, intelligence and technology—to help New Delhi become a major power and balance China. However, India seeks multipolarity and strategic autonomy rather than formal alliance with Washington. Despite strong economic gains since 1991 reforms, India still lags far behind China in GDP, technology, manufacturing and military capacity, making it unlikely to match China by mid-century. At the same time, India is turning illiberal under rising Hindu nationalism and concentrated executive power, weakening the liberal-democratic foundations that once made it an attractive U.S. partner. That combination—limited material capacity, a multipolar foreign policy stance, and democratic backsliding—means India may grow larger but will struggle to wield decisive global influence or fully substitute for U.S. leadership in Asia.

Key points

• U.S.–India ties have deepened across administrations (Bush to Biden) with nuclear, defense, intelligence and advanced-technology cooperation intended to bolster India as a counterweight to China.
• India prizes strategic autonomy and multipolarity, refuses formal alliances, and maintains ties with rivals (Russia, Iran, China), limiting how closely it will align with the U.S.
• Economic progress since 1991 lifted growth to ~6.5% historically, but India still trails China by a large margin; realistic growth paths make India far less likely to match China’s scale or capabilities by midcentury.
• India’s structural weaknesses—low manufacturing integration, limited R&D, human-capital gaps—constrain faster convergence with China.
• Rising illiberalism and Hindu nationalism under the BJP erode India’s liberal-democratic institutions, increasing polarization, internal security burdens, and reducing its soft‑power and domestic resilience.
• Consequence: India will be more powerful materially but likely not powerful enough or politically aligned enough to replace U.S. leadership in Asia; U.S.–India partnership will remain important but limited and potentially more transactional.

Implications for U.S. strategy

• Diversify approaches. The United States should avoid treating India as a substitute for broader regional strategy. Enhance partnerships across the Indo-Pacific (Japan, Australia, Vietnam, South Korea, ASEAN) while deepening ties with India where interests align. This hedges against India’s strategic autonomy and preserves leverage with other partners.
• Pursue selective cooperation. Focus on areas of clear mutual benefit — defense interoperability, intelligence-sharing on maritime security, supply‑chain resilience (critical minerals, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals), climate and clean energy technology, and space — while being realistic about limits on technology transfers that could entangle the U.S. in risky geopolitical competition.
• Condition strategic deepening on democratic norms. The U.S. should candidly raise concerns about human rights, religious freedom, and rule-of-law erosion. While blunt public pressure can backfire, targeted diplomacy, civil-society support, and linking cooperation in sensitive areas (e.g., high-end dual-use technology) to transparency and safeguards can protect both U.S. values and strategic interests.
• Invest in people-to-people ties. Expand educational exchanges, research collaboration, and business linkages to sustain long-term strategic affinity even if political trajectories diverge. Bolstering Indian civil society, the judiciary, and independent media through non-governmental channels can help preserve democratic resilience.
• Strengthen economic and technological competition with China independently of India. The U.S. should accelerate domestic industrial policy (chips, clean energy, manufacturing incentives) and work with allies to secure supply chains. Treat India as one important partner within a broader coalition, not the linchpin.

Likely trajectories for India

• Continued economic ascent but uneven convergence. India is likely to remain one of the world’s fastest‑growing large economies, but growth will be heterogeneous across states and sectors. Without major reforms in labor markets, land use, infrastructure, and education quality, India’s per‑capita catch-up to China will be slow.
• Incremental military modernization and regional influence. India will continue to strengthen naval and air capabilities to protect maritime interests in the Indian Ocean and expand diplomatic clout in South Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Africa. But logistics, industrial base limits, and doctrinal choices will constrain rapid power projection.
• Persistent multipolar foreign policy. Expect India to continue balancing relations among the U.S., Russia, and regional powers, using strategic ambiguity to maximize autonomy. New Delhi will cooperate with the U.S. where interests converge (e.g., constraining Chinese coercion) while resisting pressures that could be seen as entangling alliances.
• Domestic political consolidation. The BJP’s dominance and institutional weakening could create greater policy continuity but also higher domestic friction, minority grievances, and potential governance vulnerabilities. Economic policy may tilt toward nationalist and protectionist measures at times, complicating deeper economic integration with the U.S. and other partners.

Policy recommendations for the U.S. (practical steps)

• Create a U.S.–India strategic economic working group to identify secure supply‑chain projects (semiconductors, batteries, rare earths) and co-finance infrastructure that ties India more closely to allied networks.
• Expand joint military exercises focused on maritime domain awareness, anti-submarine warfare, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief to build operational compatibility without formal alliances.
• Condition advanced-technology cooperation on clear safeguards: export controls, end-use verification, and reciprocal transparency to prevent unintended technology diffusion.
• Invest in subnational engagement. Build direct links with Indian states, universities, and businesses to diversify partnerships beyond the federal level and leverage reformist state governments.
• Support democratic resilience through targeted programs: judicial exchanges, media-freedom grants, civic-education initiatives, and support for independent research institutions.

Conclusion

India’s rise presents both strategic opportunity and limits. It is a critical partner for addressing regional challenges and for providing an alternative center of gravity in Asia, but its constrained material capabilities, multipolar instincts, and democratic backsliding mean it is unlikely to become a full strategic substitute for the United States. U.S. policy should therefore be pragmatic: deepen cooperation where interests align, push for democratic norms and institutional resilience, and maintain a broader network of alliances and partnerships to shape an Indo-Pacific that preserves peace, open commerce, and resists coercion.