Gulf States Geopolitics: Middle East Order after Iran War

Future of US Gulf Strategic Relationship

The recent Gulf war between Iran and U.S./Israeli-aligned forces exposed deep strategic strain: Gulf states feel vulnerable despite long U.S. security guarantees, Iran’s missile-and-drone attacks disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and regional economies, and Gulf leaders are rethinking their reliance on Washington. Yet no alternative power can fully replace the U.S. role, so the Gulf will probably keep leaning on Washington while also pursuing limited détente with Tehran, deeper ties with other powers, and diversification of economic and security partnerships. The crisis gives the U.S. an opportunity to rebuild trust by leading maritime-security efforts, co-developing missile and counter-drone defenses with Gulf partners, and reviving the broader economic and technological partnership agenda.

The war showed U.S. security guarantees failed to prevent Iranian strikes, prompting Gulf soul‑searching about dependence on Washington but not offering a realistic substitute. In short, Gulf options are limited: collective Gulf defense is hampered by internal divisions; some states may seek bilateral accommodation with Iran to keep trade flowing; others will deepen ties with China, Russia, India, and middle powers—but none can match U.S. security, technology, and intelligence support.

The Strait of Hormuz blockade highlighted urgent needs for secure, redundant infrastructure and alternative pipelines/ports; these create investment opportunities (energy corridors, rail, secure data centers) for Gulf and U.S. firms.

Importantly, the U.S. can regain leverage by leading a coalition to reopen and secure the Strait, partnering with Gulf states to build next‑generation air/missile and counter‑drone defenses, and renewing the economic/tech agenda (AI, energy, infrastructure) to make security cooperation mutually beneficial.

The crisis may push Gulf states to act pragmatically and individually; Washington’s willingness to lead diplomatically and economically will determine whether ties are salvaged or the region drifts farther from U.S. influence.

The Viability of Saudi Arabia’s Hedging Strategy

 Saudi Arabia has pursued a cautious, hedging strategy during the recent Iran–Israel–U.S. war: avoiding direct military escalation while protecting its economy and strategic independence. Riyadh balanced tacit cooperation with mediation efforts, deepening alternative regional and international partnerships (Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, China) and investing in its own defenses. Saudi leaders fear both a hegemonic Iran and an ascendant Israel, distrust sole reliance on the United States, and seek a new regional security architecture and a negotiated, enforceable non‑aggression arrangement with Iran — though mutual distrust makes that difficult. Key points

• Saudi restraint: Riyadh allowed U.S. use of bases but avoided direct retaliation for Iran’s strikes to protect oil infrastructure and avoid Houthi reprisals; it favored mediation and de‑escalation over joining the war.
• Longstanding hedging: Saudi policy aims to prevent either Iran or Israel becoming regional hegemon; recent events (attacks on Saudi facilities, U.S. unreliability) pushed Riyadh to diversify security partners and military capabilities.
• New partnerships and coalitions: Saudi Arabia has strengthened ties with Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey (and China economically), signed a defense pact with Pakistan, and sought technology and air‑defense cooperation beyond the U.S. umbrella.
• Regional security dilemma: Riyadh wants a Gulf security framework and non‑aggression arrangements with Iran (including guarantees about U.S. bases), but deep mutual distrust and hawkish Iranian leaders complicate any durable settlement.
• Strategic calculus: If Iran massively escalates and targets Saudi infrastructure, Riyadh could enter the war; otherwise it will work to preserve economic development, broaden security options, and try to shape postwar arrangements to maintain regional influence.

 The Role of Israel in the Middle East Order

 Iran’s direct attacks on Israeli and Gulf territories during the war that began Feb 28 exposed the fragility of a U.S.-led regional order built on Israeli military dominance and Gulf reliance on Washington. Gulf states—shocked by damage to infrastructure, closed shipping routes, and the realization neutrality is not respected—are rethinking security: deepening ties with the U.S. where necessary, diversifying arms suppliers and partners (Turkey, South Korea, Pakistan, China, Europe), strengthening domestic defense industries, and seeking greater coordination among themselves rather than accepting an arrangement that sidelines their interests in favor of Israeli objectives.

Iran’s strikes on Israel and then Gulf infrastructure (airports, ports, oil, desalination; closure of the Strait of Hormuz) damaged Gulf states’ safety and business reputations, showing neutrality is not a reliable protection.

The war revealed limits of a security order premised on Israeli dominance; Gulf leaders fear Israel’s willingness to act preemptively and put them at risk. Thus, the idea of Israeli leadership in Middle East security will face pushback. Expect Gulf responses to diverged (Oman restraint; UAE, Bahrain closer to U.S./Israel; Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi taking mixed positions), reflecting historical rivalries and differing threat perceptions.

In short, Gulf states are “going poly”: diversifying arms suppliers and security partners (Turkey, South Korea, Pakistan, Europe, China), building local defense industries, and pursuing greater intra-Gulf coordination (shared early warning, pooled air defenses).

Over the long-term the Gulf seeks greater strategic autonomy and a regional security architecture that respects their interests rather than treating them as mere enablers of U.S.-Israeli policy. This will put a limit on US-Israeli plans for Israel to take a bigger role in a future security order.

Future of the Abraham Accords

The so-called “Axis of Abraham”—the 2020-era alignment between Israel and several Arab Gulf states—has unraveled because its participants now pursue different, often competing visions for the Middle East. While some Gulf states prioritize transactional security ties, energy strategy, and hedging between great powers, Israel seeks deeper regional integration and normalization that serves its diplomatic and security ambitions. These diverging priorities, together with shifting U.S. posture, Russia and China’s greater regional roles, and local conflicts, mean the earlier pragmatic cooperation is fragmenting rather than solidifying into a durable bloc.

The “Axis of Abraham” was a pragmatic, transactional set of ties (security, intelligence, trade, tech) rather than a shared strategic vision or ideological alliance. Gulf states (notably Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar) now balance relations with Israel against priorities such as energy strategy, economic diversification, internal stability, Iran deterrence, and ties with China/Russia.

An important aspect was the future India Middle Eastern Corridor (IMEC) to counter the Chinese Belt and Road Inititative. This is probably on hold for now but has backing still – the UAE, Israel and India. Eventually Saudi Arabia should sign up but that depends on what happens with Gaza and the the Palestinian issue. The Saudis will not commit before some type of closure on the Palestinian issue happens.

Israel seeks broader normalization and regional integration to break strategic isolation, but its objectives often clash with Gulf interests and Palestinian sensitivities.

U.S. strategic recalibration and competition from China/Russia complicate and fragment the cooperation framework—Gulf states hedge rather than fully commit.

Local crises and unresolved Palestinian issues limit popular legitimacy and political durability of normalization, reducing prospects for a permanent “axis.”

Likely Scenarios for Future Middle East Order

The Gulf states are rethinking their reliance on the United States after a new Israel–Iran war left them bearing much of Iran’s missile-and-drone retaliation. While Washington remains the only power able to provide the scale of military support they need, Gulf leaders now seek greater autonomy: deeper intra‑Gulf security cooperation, flexible “minilateral” partnerships with regional and extra‑regional states, and revived diplomacy (including limited engagement with Iran) to manage escalation and protect economic diversification plans.

The Gulf monarchies face a fragile moment after a U.S.–Iran flare-up: leaders publicly project strength, but the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) confronts hard security and political limits. Three possible paths emerge—greater GCC cooperation on defense, continued limited ad-hoc coordination, or a damaging split that deepens rivalry and invites outside interference. Economic competition, divergent relations with the U.S., Israel and Iran, and mutual distrust make deeper integration difficult, but stronger collective action would best protect Gulf interests.

• Three scenarios: (1) More Cooperative Council—integrated air defenses, pooled defense procurement, local arms production, linked trade/energy infrastructure (pipelines, rail) and deliberate use of complementary member strengths; (2) Status Quo—some wartime coordination (air-defense sharing, logistics, limited infrastructure links) but persistent political divisions prevent full integration; (3) New Gulf Rift—open competition (especially Saudi Arabia vs UAE), polarization over Israel and U.S. policy, and divergent accommodation of Iran that could fragment the bloc.
• Drivers for cooperation: shared exposure to Iranian strikes, shortages in air-defense supplies, incentive to reduce U.S. dependence, and the strategic benefits of coordinated economic and security planning.
• Obstacles: historical intra-GCC disputes (borders, politics, espionage), blame over how the war unfolded, divergent foreign-policy outlooks (Oman’s diplomacy vs UAE’s closer ties to Israel/US), and commercial rivalry.
• Stakes: A united GCC would better defend regional security and shape its economic future; fragmentation would increase vulnerability to external influence and reduce the Gulf’s ability to control outcomes in any prolonged U.S.–Iran confrontation.

The Israel–Iran war (and U.S. alignment with Israel) exposed Gulf states to much of Tehran’s attacks, damaging trade routes, energy infrastructure and reputations for commercial safety. Dependence on U.S. matériel, bases and command networks remains real, but Gulf publics and rulers question Washington’s reliability and desire more strategic independence. Hedging is natural and this should be expected.

Practical responses include enmeshing missile‑defense and early‑warning systems regionally, forming task‑specific minilaterals (e.g., maritime security, drone defense), and expanding security ties with states like India, Pakistan, Turkey, China. Regarding China, we think the Gulf states will be more cautious now since China showed weakness during the war and did provide Iran with intelligence and possibly war material that was used against the Gulf states.

Diplomacy must be emphasized: restore and expand channels with Iran (while maintaining deterrence), keep limited engagement with Israel to curb destabilizing actions, and create communication mechanisms/hotlines to reduce miscalculation.

The Gulf’s strategic aim is to protect stability needed for economic diversification (Vision 2030 models); building collective capacity and shaping the regional environment can mitigate future spillovers even if they cannot instantly replace U.S. guarantees.