Geopolitics, US-Brazil Relations and Tariffs after Bolsonaro Verdict

US Tariffs and Bolsonaro Verdict Push US-Brazil Apart

Donald Trump has dramatically escalated U.S. interference in Brazil by imposing a 50% tariff on many Brazilian goods and applying Magnitsky sanctions to Judge Alexandre de Moraes, citing alleged threats to free and fair elections and U.S. citizens’ free expression. The moves align Trump with Jair Bolsonaro and his allies, heighten bilateral tensions, and risk destabilizing regional politics. Bolsonaro’s alleged role in planning the 2023 Brasília attacks and a broader campaign to undermine Brazil’s democratic institutions, plus deep ties between Bolsonaro’s family, Steve Bannon, and Trump-era actors pushing a transnational far-right agenda.

In short, Trump’s 50% tariff on many Brazilian imports was more than an economic shock; it was a political and geopolitical catalyst. While exemptions blunted some damage, the move strengthened Brazil’s impetus to diversify markets and pursue greater strategic autonomy. The move alarmed Brazil but produced mixed domestic results: it temporarily boosted President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s approval ratings and strengthened public and official sentiment against the United States, accelerating Brazil’s geopolitical pivot toward China and other partners. China publicly backed Brazil, and Brazilian leaders are pushing diversification (BRICS, EU-Mercosur, etc.) while trade negotiations and exemption talks continue.

It should be noted that although Trump imposed a 50% tariff on many Brazilian imports, he granted 694 exceptions for about 4,000 products (including Embraer aircraft, orange juice, pig iron and petroleum, but excluding coffee and beef).

Key points

• Trump issued an open letter and executive order imposing steep tariffs (50%) on Brazilian goods (with some exemptions) and sanctioned Brazil’s High Court Judge Alexandre de Moraes under the Magnitsky Act.
• The measures are framed by Trump as responses to violations of electoral fairness and free speech, but critics see them as political interference favoring former president Jair Bolsonaro.
• Brazilian investigations (Operação Contragolpe) allege Bolsonaro supported plots to disrupt the 2023 inauguration, spread misinformation, and even plan violence or assassination; these actions contributed to removal of Bolsonaro’s political rights.
• Eduardo Bolsonaro and links to Steve Bannon/Trump networks have fostered transnational far-right coordination and lobbying in Washington, including attempts to secure asylum or intervention.
• Analysts warn Trump’s personalistic, transactional foreign policy and sanctions on a democratic judiciary risk undermining Brazil’s sovereignty, straining US–Brazil and regional relations, and setting a dangerous precedent for U.S. treatment of democratic countries.
• Trump’s tariff: 50% rate on many Brazilian goods, with 694 exemptions covering ~4,000 items; key exports like coffee and beef were excluded from exceptions.
• Political impact: Tariffs boosted Lula’s domestic popularity and produced a “rally around the flag” effect that undercut opposition momentum tied to Bolsonaro.
• Geopolitical shift: Public opinion of the U.S. declined while confidence in China rose; China expressed support for Brazil, accelerating Brazil’s strategic turn toward Beijing and diversification efforts (BRICS, EU-Mercosur).
• Ongoing uncertainty: Exemptions open space for negotiations and possible tariff reductions, so the situation and its political/economic effects may continue to change.

Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

U.S.-Brazil relations are entering a new phase as both countries confront shifting global dynamics—especially U.S.-China rivalry—and internal challenges (democracy, development, crime, and climate). Brazil under Lula seeks greater global voice and strategic autonomy, pursuing independent diplomacy including engagement with China, while Washington wants a deeper partnership. We suggest a pragmatic cooperation across democracy support, development and education, green economy and climate, crime/security (including Amazon protection), and multilateral governance reform, recognizing Brazil’s legitimate aspirations and the limits of expecting it to become an anti‑China proxy.

In short, U.S.-Brazil relations are at an inflection point. Neither default alignment nor adversarial rivalry serves the strategic interests of either country. A pragmatic, interest-based partnership—rooted in respect for Brazil’s autonomy and focused on deliverable cooperation across climate, development, technology, security, and democratic resilience—can strengthen both nations and contribute to a more stable, rules-based global order. Washington should engage actively and constructively, offering partnership rather than demands, and designing programs that produce tangible benefits for Brazilian citizens. Ideally, if managed wisely, deeper U.S.-Brazil cooperation can be a stabilizing force in an era of great-power competition and global uncertainty.

Key points

• Geopolitical shift: U.S.-China rivalry and changing global order force both Washington and Brasília to update their strategies; Brazil seeks greater global influence and strategic autonomy.
• Democracy and institutions: U.S. support for electoral integrity and rule-of-law capacity-building is important; shared work on disinformation, judicial independence, and parliamentary exchanges can strengthen both democracies.
• Development and jobs: Brazil needs a refreshed national development strategy (industrial policy, up-skilling, infrastructure); U.S. cooperation and private investment can help, especially under “friend-shoring”/re‑globalization dynamics.
• Climate and green economy: Brazil has comparative advantages (renewables, green hydrogen, critical minerals, agriculture); joint U.S.-Brazil efforts on technology transfer, finance, Amazon jobs/urbanization, and maritime protection offer big opportunities.
• Security and crime: Organized crime (PCC), synthetic drugs, environmental crime, and cybercrime are growing threats with global links; cooperation on intelligence, anti-corruption, alternative livelihoods, and pandemic prevention is needed.
• Multilateral governance: Brazil legitimately seeks greater voice (e.g., UNSC reform); the U.S. should accommodate Brazil’s aspirations while opposing destabilizing behavior by China—aiming for engagement, not coercive alignment.

Geopolitical Forecast

We expect the attempt by the right in Brazil to gain a pardon for Bolsonaro to not succeed in the short-term. Perhaps he will recieve a political pardon later, especially if the right gains power in Brazil again. Thus, Lula will need to diversify from the US by pushing for the conclusion of trade agreements with Europe sooner for example. We should also expect a closer realignment with China.

In the medium to long-term, the probability of US-Brazil relations should be better once both Trump and Lula are no longer in power. Geopolical relations today at least with Trump have emphasized relationships with leaders. Both Lula and Trump are diametrically opposed to each other plus Lula is sympethetic to more Chinese influence in Brazil.