Cuba Faced Significant Issues in 2025: Future?

US and Geopolitics in Latin America

Our view is tht Cuba is on the brink of collapse. As mentioned in a prior article, Cuba would face severe pressure if Venezuelian oil is cut off. Cuba depends on cheap oil from the Venezuelian social autocracy. Although Cuba’s dense intellegence network makes it difficult to organize against the regime, we see more discontent and think a change of leadership has a chance in 2026.

Cuba is in deep economic and social crisis: wages buy almost nothing, shortages of food, medicine, electricity and water are widespread, and public services have collapsed. Millions rely on remittances or private-sector work; many — especially professionals — have emigrated, leaving severe labor shortages. The state tolerates a growing but constrained private sector while fearing its political effects. With a fragmented opposition, tight media control and an ageing leadership unwilling to liberalize fully, the country looks unstable and many Cubans want to leave.

Living standards: Official monthly wages (around 6,500 pesos ≈ $14 at the informal rate) are far below basic costs; staples and electricity/water shortages make daily life dire; food insecurity and poor access to medicine are widespread.

Emigration and demographics: Roughly a quarter of the population has left in recent years; fertility has plunged (≈1.29 children per woman) and many professionals (doctors, artists) have emigrated, creating major workforce gaps. A Spanish survey had about 78% of all Cubans wanting to leave.

Economy: Output has collapsed in traditional sectors (e.g., sugar) and tourism never recovered after COVID; inflation and currency devaluation have deepened the crisis; private firms now account for a large share of retail and employment but face legal uncertainty.

Politics and reform: The regime cautiously allows private enterprise to survive the population but resists deep political or economic liberalization for fear of losing control; the opposition is fragmented and heavily repressed, limiting a clear path to change.

The U.S. has a rare chance to help remove the repressive regimes in Venezuela and Cuba, but successful transitions will be difficult and require sustained international leadership and aid. Venezuela faces severe political repression, mass arrests, and a collapsing economy but could recover using its oil wealth if democratic forces (led by figures like María Corina Machado) receive help. Cuba’s problems are deeper: decades of repression have hollowed out civil society and the economy, so post‑dictatorship recovery will demand a broad, multilateral effort to rebuild institutions and infrastructure.

In Cuba public dissatisfaction is rising: large emigration, more frequent protests (including student protests over internet-fee hikes), and growing skepticism about government explanations. External factors (end of foreign patrons, U.S. policy shifts and sanctions) and internal mismanagement have combined to worsen living conditions and constrain Cuba’s ability to import essentials.

As mentioned earlier, Emigration has accelerated (about 1 million people in recent years), and protests—once rare—are increasing, including student protests over telecom fee hikes. Recent U.S. policy moves under the Trump administration tightened restrictions (sanctions, travel and remittance measures, legal actions over confiscated property), further limiting Cuba’s economic options. Main points:

• Venezuela: Maduro’s regime is intensifying repression (about 900 political prisoners); opposition leaders and families are targeted; transition needs U.S. and international leadership plus humanitarian and financial assistance to stabilize hyperinflation, hunger, and to secure military support for a peaceful transfer.
• Cuba: Longstanding authoritarian control has destroyed many civic institutions and left an ailing economy (power, water, health, emigration problems); recovery is more complex and requires multilateral reconstruction, rule‑of‑law reform, and external investment/support.
• Geopolitics: A U.S. retreat would bolster Cuba and Venezuela’s patrons (China, Russia) and harm U.S. credibility; U.S. leadership is framed as a national‑security interest but should work with Latin American partners and Cuban civil society.

Short Background to Current Mess in Cuba

Cuba’s brief post-2014 opening — driven by Raúl Castro’s limited economic reforms and U.S.–Cuba normalization under Obama — raised hopes for modernization. Those hopes collapsed under a mix of external shocks (Trump-era sanctions, COVID-19, loss of Venezuelan oil aid, hurricanes) and internal failures (partial, poorly sequenced reforms; bad monetary policy; state reluctance to cede political control). The result is a deep economic and social crisis: mass emigration, collapsing GDP and power grid, runaway inflation and currency fragmentation, rising inequality, repression of protests, and weak prospects for large-scale foreign rescue. meaningful recovery would require far deeper economic liberalization, better monetary and fiscal policy, and political opening — changes Cuban leaders so far have been unwilling or unable to make. Key points:

• Initial reforms and U.S. normalization (2014–16) created momentum: more small private businesses, remittances, tourism and investor interest — but Havana limited reforms and retained central controls.
• External shocks reversed gains: Trump tightened sanctions, curtailed travel and remittances, invoked Helms-Burton; COVID-19 wiped out tourism; Venezuelan aid fell; hurricanes and disease outbreaks worsened humanitarian conditions.
• Poor domestic policy amplified the crisis: ill-timed currency unification, money printing, price shocks, and ad hoc measures created hyperinflation, a huge informal exchange market, and collapsing public trust in banks.
• Private sector growth since 2021 has been real (now large share of employment, tax receipts and retail) but fragile: restrictions, lack of foreign-exchange mechanisms, and military-dominated conglomerates (GAESA) limit competition and raise inequality.
• Structural obstacles remain: dilapidated power and transport infrastructure, large fiscal deficits, tiered exchange rates, weak rule of law for investors, and political unwillingness to democratize make deep recovery unlikely without major reform.
• External partners (Russia, China) offer limited, conditional help; reliance on outside bailouts is risky. Long-term recovery needs comprehensive liberalization, fiscal discipline, currency unification, and political reforms — steps Cuban leadership appears reluctant to take.

State of Freedoms in Cuba

According to the Freedom House, Cuba dropped from a very low score of 12 in 2024 to an even lower score of 9 in 2025. It scored only 1 out of 40 for political rights and and 9 out of 60 for civil liberties. In 2024, 2023 and 2022, civil liberties was 11 out of 60. This had decreased from 12 and 14 in prior years. Political rights have been almost non-existent at 1/40 for many years. In short, a repressive system is getting more repressive. This is on top of a worsening economic situation.

Cuba is a one-party communist state that outlaws political pluralism, bans independent media, suppresses dissent, and severely restricts civil liberties. Although recent reforms have allowed limited private-sector activity and foreign investment, the government continues to dominate the economy. A leadership transition since 2018 and a new constitution have not changed the regime’s undemocratic character. Key points:

• Political system: One-party rule; no political pluralism and ongoing suppression of dissent.
• Media and internet: Independent media banned; networks and social media restricted or blocked; users have been arrested.
• Economy: State-dominated despite reforms permitting some private enterprise and foreign investment.
• Recent changes: New constitution and legal adjustments since 2018, but core authoritarian practices persist.
• Civic context: Basic civil liberties remain severely limited; elections and political processes are not free.